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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, a new type of settlement emerged in 
litigation over patents covering pharmaceutical products. This 
phenomenon passed largely unnoticed in most other litigation 
contexts, but in the very specific world of pharmaceutical patent 
litigation, it has resulted in high-profile cases involving the Federal 
Trade Commission ("FTC"), the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and 
numerous private plaintiffs. Congress has attempted - thus far 
unsuccessfully - to provide a legislative solution, and numerous law 
professors have debated the issue on the pages of various law 
journals. Traditionally, the alleged trespasser on someone else's rights 
pays the rights holder to settle the litigation. In these new settlements, 
however, it is the rights holder that pays the alleged trespasser. For 
these reasons, such settlements have been termed "reverse payment 
settlements" or simply "reverse settlements."l 
In this Article, I propose a new approach and argue that the 
proper way to police these agreements is not by subjecting them to an 
antitrust analysis, but by ordering a reexamination of any patent 
involved in a reverse settlement. Although the reverse settlements 
have been attacked by some commentators,2 the FTC,3 and a number 
oflegislators4 as anti-competitive, anti-consumer, and an abuse of the 
patent, in my view the question of whether the settlement is pro- or 
anti-competitive turns on the strength of the patent and the likely 
conclusion of the litigation. The antitrust analysis - especially under 
the per se approach advocated by the FTC5 - simply is not designed 
1. See. e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment 
Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. LJ. 1303, 1315 (2010) (referring 
to the agreements both as "reverse payment settlements" and "reverse settlements"); 
Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements: Presumptions. 
Procedural Burdens. and Covenants Not to Sue Generic Drug Manufacturers, 26 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 141, 156 (2010) (same). Sometimes these 
settlements are also referred to as "pay-for-delay" settlements, or "exit payment" 
settlements. See. e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New 
Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 629,632 (2009); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rulesfor Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. 
REv. 11, 18 (2004). 
2. See infra Part IV.D. 
3. See infra Part IV.B. 
4. See infra Part IVA. 
5. See, e.g., in re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 FTC. 956,968 (2003), vacated sub nom. 
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (lith Cir. 2005) (while declining to apply a 
per se label and purporting to utilize a "rule of reason" analysis, the FTC sought to prohibit 
all reverse settlements "except[ing] payments that are limited to litigation costs up to $2 
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to address patent scope and validity issues, and therefore cannot 
properly differentiate between pro- and anti-competitive settlements. 
Instead, because the patent law is designed to address this very 
question, it should be relied on to police reverse settlements. 
The rise of reverse settlement agreements is a direct consequence 
of the incentives created by the Hatch-Waxman Act. On the one hand, 
the Act creates an incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge 
existing patents without much regard for their strength. As a reward 
for such challenges, Hatch-Waxman bestows a 180-day marketing 
exclusivity period on the first challenger.6 On the other hand, by 
permitting the challenger to retain the exclusivity period irrespective 
of the litigation's outcome,7 the Act encourages the challenger to enter 
into a settlement agreement which would permit market entry prior to 
the patent's expiration. Such agreements would provide for payments 
from the patentee to the generic until the date of actual market entry, 
while allowing the generic to maintain the economic benefits of the 
exclusivity period when the market entry finally occurs.8 
The patentee is also incentivized to settle on similar terms 
because a settlement assures monopoly rents for some defined time 
into the future. 9 While that time may be shorter than the length of the 
patent, the settlement insures the patentee against the possibility of 
losing the suit and thus losing its monopoly earlier than what the 
settlement agreement would provide. )0 
In other words, the Act incentivizes the patentee and the 
challenger to enter a settlement "involv[ing] a negotiated market entry 
date for the generic product" that "typically occurs later than would 
have likely occurred if the generic company had prevailed in the 
patent dispute [but earlier than the patent expiration date], i.e., the 
parties split the remaining patent term.")) On the surface, these 
settlements may look like traditional horizontal agreements between 
competitors - agreements that have long been held per se illegal 
million"); FED. TRADE COMM'N., PAY-FOR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/20l0101I 
100ll2payfordelayrpt.pdf(recommending that Congress ban such settlements). 
6.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (West 2011); see also infra notes 41-45 and 
accompanying text. 
7. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
8. See Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust 
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494-502 (2007) (defining 
reverse settlement agreements). 
9. See Laura J. Grebe, Comment, Generic Entry in a Rough Economy- Proposed 
Legislation May Ease Health Care Costs, 14 MARQ. IN TELL. PROP. L. REv. 167, 174-75 
(2010) (citing in re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187,209-10 n.24 (2d Cir. 
2006». 
10. See James F. Ponsoldt & W. Hennen Ehrenc1ou, The Antitrust Legality of 
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements, 2006 U.ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'y 37, 52. 
11. Holman, supra note 8, at 495. 
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under the antitrust laws. 12 The thrust of the antitrust argument is that 
these agreements are detrimental to consumers because they allow the 
patentee to unjustifiably maintain monopoly pricingY Further, 
because the Hatch-Waxman Act precludes the entry of other generic 
companies until the I80-day exclusivity period has expired, 
settlements that delay the entry of the first generic also necessarily 
delay the entry of other generic manufacturers. 14 Consequently, the 
antitrust argument goes, reverse settlement agreements are not just 
horizontal restraints on trade as between the settling parties, but are in 
effect a restraint on trade as between all market participants. 
What is missing from the antitrust analysis is the recognition that 
settlements are detrimental to consumers only if the generic 
challenger would have prevailed in litigation. These settlements serve 
to prevent market entry for generic manufacturers and therefore force 
consumers to pay higher, monopoly rents for longer periods than they 
would have had the suits gone to judgment and the generic 
manufacturers prevailed. On the other hand, if the patentee would 
have prevailed, then the consumers benefit from a reverse settlement, 
as it allows for the generic's entry prior to the expiration of the patent. 
Thus, consumers obtain lower, non-monopolistic prices earlier than 
they otherwise would have. It is difficult for antitrust law to 
distinguish between these two situations. To the extent that the 
antitrust approach could take this distinction into account (for 
instance, by applying the rule of reason analysis to the settlement), it 
would transform the traditional economic arguments into patent 
litigation - the very litigation that the settlement between the 
patentee and the generic sought to avoid. Thus, even assuming that the 
rule of reason antitrust analysis could differentiate between the pro-
and anti-competitive reverse settlements, such an approach would 
undermine the raison d'etre for these settlements. 
Additionally, the antitrust approach may undermine patent law 
uniformity, as presumably whatever findings a district court would 
make on antitrust liability could - and would - be appealed. The 
appeals, like any other appeal on issues of antitrust law, would likely 
be heard by the regional circuit courts of appeals,15 which would then 
12. See in re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 905-08 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that reverse settlements are "naked, horizontal restraint[ s 1 of trade and, as such, per 
se illegal"). 
13. See Sandoval, supra note 1, at 147 (stating the FTC's view '·that such reverse 
payment settlements maintain high prices by averting generic competition with a patented 
drug, unduly allowing the patent holder to charge monopoly profits"). 
14. See Uche Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The 
PharmaceuticalindustlY, Ethics. and Global Trade, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 203, 249 n.223 
(2005) (quoting FAMILIES USA, GETTING ACCESS TO GENERIC DRUGS: A TiMELINE (2002), 
available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/genericstimelinef9a4 . pdf). 
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). The Supreme Court has held that when patent law is 
relevant only to the defenses raised, the case does not "arise under" the patent laws, and 
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be tasked with evaluating the validity and strength of the patents 
underlying the antitrust litigation. This could put the regional circuits 
on a collision course with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, which is a specialist court with exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent disputes. 16 Such an outcome would put complicated technical 
patent questions in the hands of non-specialist judges, and would run 
directly contrary to the congressional desire for uniformity of patent 
law throughout the country. 17 
In short, the antitrust approach is not a promising solution to the 
very real problems raised by reverse settlements. A different solution 
must then be used in order to differentiate between pro- and anti-
competitive reverse settlements. This solution is found in the patent 
law itself. 
Part II of this Article focuses on the structure, purpose, and 
mechanics of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the understanding of which is 
necessary in order to appreciate how the problem of reverse 
settlements arises. Part III discusses several leading reverse settlement 
cases, each of which has been challenged under antitrust law. This 
discussion will illustrate features that are common to such settlements, 
as well as the struggle that lawyers and judges face in attempting to 
shoehorn the problem of reverse settlements into an antitrust-based 
solution. 
Part IV describes the response to the reverse settlement issue 
from the judicial, executive, and legislative branches. It discusses 
academic commentary and offers criticism of the proposals advanced 
thus far. 
Part V presents a solution to the problem of reverse settlements 
by arguing that reverse settlements should trigger the Patent Office-
conducted reexamination proceedings. Part V further outlines what 
conditions must be satisfied to order the patent into reexamination and 
what the scope of the reexamination should be. 
Part VI identifies and addresses potential counterarguments to 
this approach, and Part VII concludes. 
therefore is to be appealed to the regional circuit. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating 
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988). That is true "even if the defense is anticipated in the 
plaintiffs complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question 
truly at issue in the case." Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983» (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if the complaint 
against a reverse settlement sounded in antitrust, it would be irrelevant that the only salient 
question to the outcome of litigation was the strength of the patent; any appeals would be 
heard by the appropriate regional circuit court of appeals. 
16. See 28 U.S.CA § 1295 (West 2011). 
17. See S. REp. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. 11,15 (stating 
that "[tlhe creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable 
uniformity in this area ofthe law"). 
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II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 
A. The Structure and Purposes of the Act 
In 1984, Congress passed a new law that streamlined the approval 
process for generic drugs. This law was officially titled the "Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,,,18 but is 
commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act19 after its two 
principal sponsors in the Senate and the House of Representatives.2o 
The Act had several purposes. First, the Act sought to bring lower-
cost generic equivalents of patented drugs to market on an expedited 
basis and thus make these drugs more widely available to the general 
pUblic.21 On the other hand, the Act sought to provide adequate 
incentives to the manufacturers and developers of pioneer drugs.22 
Finally, the Act, through encouraging litigation over the patents that 
covered these drugs, sought to clear the landscape of invalid patents 
18. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417,98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
19. See. e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALEJ. HEALTHPOL'y 
L. & ETHICS 717, 727 (2005) ('"In 1984, Congress added two more provisions for FDA-
administered market exclusivity in the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Resloration 
Act of1984, commonly known as the . Hatch-Waxman Act. "'). 
20. See Joel Graham, The Legality of Hatch-Waxman Pharmaceutical Settlements: Is the 
Terazosin Test the Proper Prescription?, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 429, 429 n.2 (2006) ('"This 
Act is typically referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act because of the congressional 
sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry Waxman." (quoting Larissa 
Burford, Note, In re Cardizem & Valley Drug Co.: The Hatch-Waxman Act, Anticompetitive 
Actions. and Regulatory Reform, 19 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 365, 365 n.2 (2004» (internal 
quotation marks omitted». 
21. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 98th Congo 1 (1984) (statement of Sen. 
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res.) ("On the one hand, lower 
drug prices - tens of millions of dollars a year in total savings - will flow from increased 
generic competition made possible by a new abbreviated new drug application which we 
will refer to as ANDA, for off-patent drugs approved after 1962."); see also Ian Jaquette, 
Comment, Merck KGaA v.lntegra Lifesciences I, Ltd: Implications of the Supreme Court's 
Decisionfor the People Who Matter Most . .. the Consumer, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 101-
02 (2007) ("Title I of the Act created an abbreviated new drug application ... process 
designed to expedite the arrival of generic drugs to the pharmaceutical marketplace by 
amending the FDA approval process."). 
22. See 130 CONGo REc. 24,430 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Henry 
Waxman) ('"The public will benefit twice; by the further incentive for research and 
development for new, innovative drugs and by the immediate reduction in drug prices when 
a generic is on the market as a competitor."). As further explained by Jaquette: 
Congress enacted Title II of the Hatch-Waxman Act as a means of 
mitigating the distortion to the patent term created by 1he FDA 
regulatory process .... Congress reasoned that restoring some of the 
lost patent life would maintain profit incentives for pioneering drug 
manufactures and thereby ensure continued innovation in the 
pharmaceutical and medical device industries. 
Jaquette, supra note 21, at 102. 
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by providing a "bounty" to generics firms that challenged the validity 
or enforceability of the patents covering brand-name drugs.23 
Prior to the passage of the Act, a generic drug manufacturer faced 
two hurdles in getting the drug on the market. First, the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act required the generic manufacturer to conduct its 
own separate tests and studies to prove that its drug was safe and 
efficacious, even if the drug was an exact copy of the brand-name 
counterpart.24 The generic applicant could not rely on data already 
compiled by the brand-name manufacturer?5 The Food and Drug 
Administration ("FDA") then had to conduct its usual evaluation of 
the application in much the same way as when the pioneer drug was 
approved?6 Second, under the Patent Act and case law interpreting 
the same, generic manufacturers were not permitted to use the pioneer 
drug as a template for designing their own generic equivalents. Such a 
23. See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., PATENT 
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 ('"THE 
HATCH- WAXMAN ACT") 27 (2005). As Schacht and Thomas put it: 
The 1984 Act provides prospective manufacturers of generic 
pharmaceuticals with a reward for challenging the patent associated 
with an approved pharmaceutical. The reward consists of a 180-day 
generic drug exclusivity period awarded to the first generic applicant 
to file a paragraph IV certification. This provision is intended to 
encourage generic applicants to challenge a listed patent for an 
approved drug product. 
id.; see also Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA's Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 54 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 195, 199 (1999) ('"The 180-day exclusivity provision is intended as an 
incentive for the first generic applicant to challenge a listed patent for the innovator drug 
product."). The same "bounty" also extends to challenges to the infringement allegations. 21 
U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B}-(C) (West 2011). However, successful challenges to validity or 
enforceability are especially important because these challenges permanently remove the 
patentee's ability to litigate on that patent See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. V. Univ. of Ill. 
Found., 402 U.S. 313,332-33 (1971); in re Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., LLC, Patent Litig., 
536 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
24. See Bret Dickey et aI., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the 
Pharmaceutical industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367,371 (2010) ('"Before Hatch-Waxman, 
the FDA also required generic manufacturers to conduct their own safety and efficacy 
studies .... "); Jeff Thomas, Schering-Plough and In re Tamoxifen: Lawful Reverse 
Payments in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 18 (2007) (stating 
that prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, "the generic manufacturer was required 
to undertake full clinical trials to prove safety and efficacy"). 
25. Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by 
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
171, 174-75 (2008) (,"Generic manufacturers could not use the NDA holder's data to 
demonstrate safety and efficacy, and were forced to conduct their own clinical trials:'). 
26. See M. Howard Morse, Settlement of intellectual Property Disputes in the 
Pharmaceutical and Medical Device industries: Antitrust Rules, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 
359, 383 (2002) ("Prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, manufacturers of generic 
drugs were required to file a new NDA and duplicate the safety and efficacy studies already 
conducted by the original applicant."); Patcharin Pisut, Freedom to Research: Room for 
Trial and Error in Drug Development After Merck KGaA V. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 
2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'y 339, 342 ("As with newly patented drugs, a competitor's 
generic copy of a name-brand drug is subject to FDA regulatory review before it is 
approved for sale in the United States. "). 
288 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 24 
use was considered to be actionable infringement?7 Thus, the 
manufacturer of the generic drug was essentially forced to wait- or 
risk costly litigation - until the patent on the generic drug expired 
before even beginning to formulate its own equivalent, and then 
continue to wait while the FDA acted on the application to approve 
the generic.28 This, of course, provided the patentee with a de facto 
extension of the patent's life by allowing the patentee to remain the 
exclusive provider of the drug for the period between the expiration of 
the patent and the submission and approval of the generic's 
application.29 As a result, generic competition usually did not begin 
until three to five years after the expiration of the underlying patent.30 
The Hatch-Waxman Act solved this problem by amending both 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Patent Act. With respect to 
the former, Congress created a new process called the Abbreviated 
New Drug Application ("ANDA") whereby a manufacturer of a 
generic drug can certifY that the drug it seeks to market is 
bioequivalent to a drug that has already been approved by the FDA.3l 
This process obviates the need for the manufacturer of the generic 
drugs to run duplicative tests to show, for the second time, that its 
drug is safe and efficacious?2 With respect to the Patent Act, Hatch-
Waxman essentially overruled the Federal Circuit's decision in Roche 
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. 33 In Roche, the court held 
that using the patented product to conduct bioequivalency 
experiments constituted infringement and could, consistent with 
27. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
28. See Sarah E. Eurek, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of 
Generic Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 0018, '\12, 
http://www.law.duke.edu~journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2003DLTROO18.pdf ("[U]ntil the early 
1980s, manufacturers wishing to develop generic counterparts to patented drugs had no 
choice but to wait for the original patents to expire before they could begin the application 
process to obtain FDA approval, which significantly delayed the market entry of generic 
drugs."). 
29. See Joyce Wing Yan Tam, Note, Biologics Revolution: The Intersection of 
Biotechnology, Patent Law. and Pharmaceutical Regulation, 98 GEO. LJ. 535, 540 (2010) 
(,,[Pharmaceutical research firms] argued that forcing generic drug makers to wait until after 
patent expiration to commence the lengthy FDA approval process, in effect, created a de 
facto term extension that further inhibited the public's access to affordable medicine."). 
30. Janet A. Gongola, Prescriptions for Change: The Hatch-Waxman Act and New 
Legislation to Increase the Availability of Generic Drugs to Consumers, 36 IND. L. REv. 
787,816 (2003). 
31. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (West 2011). 
32. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2001). As 
the Mylan court explained: 
Id. 
An ANDA offers an expedited approval process for generic drug 
manufacturers. Instead of filing a full NDA with new safety and 
efficacy studies, in an ANDA a generic manufacturer may rely in part 
on the pioneer manufacturer's work by submitting data demonstrating 
the generic product's bioequivalence with the previously approved 
drug. 
33. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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general rules of equity, be enjoined.34 The Hatch-Waxman Act 
abolished that rule.35 Under Section 271 of the Patent Act, it is no 
longer "an act of infringement to make, use ... or sell ... a patented 
invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the development 
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates 
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.,,36 Thus, any experimentation 
with a patented drug that is undertaken for the purposes of submitting 
an ANDA is no longer considered infringement?7 These two sections 
in combination were meant to spur the process of bringing lower cost 
. d k 38 genenc rugs to mar et.' 
To counter-balance the benefit conferred on the generics, and to 
continue to promote the development of pioneer drugs, Congress 
enacted rules, as part of the Hatch-Waxman Act, that were meant to 
benefit brand-name manufacturers. Specifically, the Act provided for 
the extension of the life of the patent to account for the delays 
associated with the FDA approval process?9 Thus, the Act sought to 
eliminate the unwarranted de facto extension of the patent term 
stemming from the inability of the generic to enter the market, but 
cushioned that blow by allowing the patentees to collect profits on 
their labors for as long as they would have been able to absent the 
FDA approval process.40 
The Act also encouraged generic manufacturers to litigate the 
validity, enforceability, and infringement of the patents covering 
brand-name drugS.41 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides that any 
generic manufacturer that successfully challenges any of those issues 
in litigation will enjoy a 180-day period of exclusivity.42 In other 
words, the FDA will not approve any other generic drug to compete 
with the brand name or the first-to- file generic until 180 days from the 
34. See id. at 865-67. 
35.35 U.S.CA § 271(e)(1) (West 2011). 
36.id. 
37. See id. 
38. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
39.35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006). This provision is what gave the Act the second half of its 
title, as this portion ofthe Act "restored" the time lost to the FDA approval process. 
40. See Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1260-61 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (discussing the distortions and their elimination by the Hatch-Waxman Act). 
41. See Steven W. Day, Note, Leaving Room for innovation: Rejecting the FTC's Stance 
Against Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 223, 228 
(2006) ("Through the Act, Congress sought to lower prices of prescription drugs by 
encouraging generic drug manufacturers to challenge patented brand-name drugs and enter 
the market."); Sarah Sorscher, Note, A Longer Monopoly for Biologics?: Considering the 
implications of Data Exclusivity As a Tool for innovation Policy, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
285, 296 (2009) ("The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages such challenges by rewarding the 
first generic firm to submit an ANDA challenging the patent."); see also H.R. REp. No. 98-
857, at 71 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 2647,2681 (minority views of Mr. 
Bliley). 
42. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (West 2011). 
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first generic's market entry.43 For the generics companies that 
successfully challenge existing patents, this provision IS very 
lucrative,44 often worth hundreds of millions of dollars.45 
B. The Mechanics of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
In order to understand how reverse settlements came about, it is 
first necessary to understand the mechanics of litigation under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act. To that end, this Part provides an overview of a 
typical litigation between manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals 
and brand-name pharmaceuticals. 
When the FDA approves any new brand-name drug for 
marketing, the manufacturer is required to submit to the FDA the 
patent number and expiration date of every patent that covers the 
brand-name drug being submitted for approval.46 If the FDA approves 
the drug, each patent is then listed in Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the 
"Orange Book.,,47 Whenever a generic manufacturer seeks approval 
for a drug via the ANDA process, it must certifY that one of four 
conditions is met: 
(I) no patent related to the pioneer drug has been 
filed; 
(II) the relevant patent has expired; 
(III) the patent will expire on a certain date; or 
43. See id.; see also Christopher S. Ponder, Comment, The Dubious Value of Hatch-
Waxman Exclusivity, 45 Hous. L. REv. 555, 560-61 (2008) ("The Act shields the 'first 
applicant' of an ANDA who makes a paragraph IV certification against competition from 
other ANDA applicants by delaying the FDA's approval of competing applications until 
180 days after the first applicant begins to commercially market the drug." (footnote 
omitted)). 
44. See Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to Achieve 
the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust issues in 
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 450 (2008) 
("During the 180-day market exclusivity period, the first ANDA applicant enjoys a market 
duopoly along with the NDA holder; therefore, the market exclusivity is a 'highly lucrative' 
reward for the generic drug company."). 
45. See Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J. H. Graham, Balancing innovation and Access: 
Patent Challenges Tip the Scales, 326 SCIENCE 370,370 (2009) (noting that the 180 days of 
exclusivity is worth, on average, $60 million per drug); see also Andrew A. Caffrey, III & 
Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and Procedure: Generic Drug Market 
Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1,8 n.26 (2004). 
46.21 U.S.CA. § 355(b)(1)(West 2011); see also Gongola, supra note 30, at 794. 
47. See Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 2007 MICH. 
ST. L. REv. 631,638. 
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(IV) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by 
the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic 
drug entity.48 
291 
If the manufacturer makes the certification under Paragraphs (1)-(111), 
no issue of patent law arises, as either there is no valid unexpired 
patent in existence, or there is a patent, but the manufacturer of the 
generic is asking that approval begin upon the expiration of that 
patent. If, however, the manufacturer of the generic substitute 
provides what is referred to as "Paragraph IV certification," it sets in 
motion a series of events that usually lead to litigation of the 
d 1 
. 49 un er ymg patent. 
Once the Paragraph IV certification is filed, the ANDA applicant 
must notifY the holder of the patent rights of his application and 
certification under Paragraph IV.50 The patentee then has forty-five 
days in which to respond.51 If the patentee chooses not to respond to 
the notification, the FDA can proceed to the approval of the ANDA 
application.52 In that situation, again, no issue of patent law arises 
because the patentee chooses not to contest the generic manufacturer's 
assertion that the relevant patents are invalid, not infringed, or both. In 
the more likely scenario, however, the patentee files suit within forty-
five days of the receipt of the generic's notification.53 The Hatch-
Waxman Act makes the filing of the ANDA a constructive act of 
infringement,54 thus permitting the patent holder to sue for an 
injunction against the approval and marketing of the generic drug.55 
48. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
49. John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Fault Lines at the Intersection oj 
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule oj Reason, 11 J. TECH. 
L. & POL' y 1, 10 (2006) ('"The filing of a patent infringement action by the brand name 
manufacturer is virtually guaranteed."). 
50.21 U.S.CA. § 355(j)(2)(B). 
51.Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
52.Id. However, the filing of a suit by the patentee is "virtually guaranteed." See Fazzio, 
supra note 49, at 10. 
53. See Fazzio, supra note 49, at 10. 
54.35 U.S.CA § 271(e)(2) (West 2011). 
55. See id. § 271(e)(4) (discussing the injunctive remedy available). Recall that prior to 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, a patentee could sue as soon as the generic manufacturer began 
experimenting in order to produce a competitive product. See supra notes 27-28 and 
accompanying text. With the passage of the Act, this avenue for litigation was closed. See 
35 U.S.CA. § 271(e)(I). However, Congress chose not to require the patentee to wait until 
the generic actually entered the market. Instead, it permitted a patentee to file suit prior to 
the approval of the generic's ANDA. The reason for this is rather straightforward. Multiple 
studies have shown that once the generic enters the market, the value of the patent drops 
considerably and can never be recovered to pre-generic entry levels, even if the generic is 
ultimately withdrawn. See Saami Zain, Sword or Shield? An Overview and Competitive 
Analysis oJthe Marketing oJ "Authorized Generics," 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 739,746 (2007) 
(stating that "generic entry often causes branded companies to quickly lose between 50 and 
80 percent of their pre-generic sales"); see also NARINDER S. BANAIT, FENWICK & WEST 
LLP, AUTHORIZED GENERICS: ANTITRUST ISSUES AND THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT 1 
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Should the patent holder choose to exercise his right to sue the 
ANDA filer, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides for an automated stay 
of the ANDA process,56 The stay remains in effect for thirty months 
or until the resolution of the lawsuit, whichever comes first.57 As a 
result of the 2003 amendments to the Hatch-Waxman framework,58 
only a single thirty-month stay is available,59 Once litigation is 
concluded in favor of the ANDA filer or once the ANDA application 
has been effectively approved as a result of the expiration of the 
thirty-month stay (whichever is later), the ANDA filer has seventy-
five days to begin to market its product or it must forfeit its I80-day 
exclusivity period,6o The exclusivity period is available to any first 
(2005), available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/IP/ Authorized_ 
Generics.pdf (stating that authorized generics allow "branded companies to maintain cash 
flow, albeit at a lowered rate, once generic competition starts"). 
56.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (West 2011). 
57.1d. The stay does not affect the FDA's evaluation of the application. However, no 
approval can be granted until either the expiration of the patent or the resolution of the 
litigation in favor of the generic manufacturer. Fazzio, supra note 49, at 10-11 (citing 21 
U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)). The stay can be extended (or shortened) by a court as a 
penalty against a party that "failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action." 21 
U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
5S. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act ("MMA") of 
2003, Pub. L. No. lOS-173, §§ 1101-02, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003), amended the Hatch-
Waxman Act to, inter alia, limit thirty-month stays, and to adjust the requirements for the 
exercise ofthe ISO-day exclusivity period. 
59.21 U.S.CA § 355(c)(3)(C). Previously, an NDA holder could amend its Orange 
Book entries to list new patents. Such an amendment would require new Paragraph IV 
certifications, which would in turn trigger a new thirty-month stay. See FED. TRADE 
COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 43-44 
(2002) [hereinafter FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY]. available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf The MMA eliminated this possibility by limiting the 
NDA holder to a single thirty-month stay. See Natalie Pous, Shifting the Balance Between 
Branded and Generic Pharmaceutical Companies: Amendments to Hatch-Waxman Past. 
Present. and Future, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 301, 309-10 (2009). On average, the thirty-month 
period is enough time to complete litigation, as the average length of a Hatch-Waxman 
patent case is twenty-nine months. S. Peter Ludwig et aI., Hatch-Waxman in the Federal 
Courts: From 1994-2004, 31 DRUG DEY. & INDUS. PHARMACY 215, 221 (2005). This time 
does not include appellate review, which takes, on average, another year.ld. The expiration 
of the thirty-month automatic stay does not necessarily enable the generic manufacturer to 
launch the drug, as the NDA holder may seek a preliminary injunction against the ANDA 
filer. 35 U.S.CA § 271(e)(4)(B) (stating that "injunctive relief may be granted against an 
infringer to prevent the commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale within the United 
States or importation into the United States of an approved drug or veterinary biological 
product"). Furthermore, studies show that generic companies are reluctant to enter the 
market absent a final decision in their favor, as that opens them up to financial liability. See 
FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra, at 22. 
60. Liu, supra note 44, at 453. Liu further explains: 
Under the new provisions, the ISO-day exclusivity period is forfeited 
if the first ANDA filer fails to market the generic version by the later 
of: (1) seventy-five days after the effective approval of its application, 
or thirty months after it was submitted, whichever is earlier; or (2) 
seventy-five days after the date on which a court decision has held 
that the NDA holder's patent is invalid or is not being infringed upon, 
a settlement has been approved by the court, or the NDA holder has 
withdrawn its patent information. 
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filer, regardless of success on the merits of a Paragraph IV claim.61 It 
is this provision that permits ANDA filers to settle suits with 
patentees while simultaneously keeping the benefits of the exclusivity 
period. In this way, the costs of patent litigation (which average $5 
million)62 are avoided, while the benefits are enjoyed. 
III. REVERSE SETTLEMENTS 
As with any litigation, settlement of patent suits is not unusual. 
Indeed, about 80% of such suits are settled.63 The rate of settlement in 
the specific context of pharmaceutical patent litigation under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is actually lower - 38%.64 Most of these 
settlements do not present any unusual problems. However, about 
45% of settlements (or 17% of cases) result in payments flowing not 
from the accused infringer to the patentee, but from the patentee to the 
infringer.6s Such an arrangement would not be particularly unusual if 
the payments were accompanied by the patentee's agreement not to 
assert the patent in the future. In that situation, the patentee would 
essentially be reimbursing the challenger for the cost of litigation and 
then permitting the challenger to enter the market. The reverse 
settlements are unusual in that the patentee pays the challenger while 
simultaneously preserving its patent monopoly. Furthermore, unlike 
usual patent litigation where the dispute touches on products that are 
already on or about to enter the market, Hatch-Waxman litigation 
occurs prior to the generic drug actually entering the market. 
id. 
61. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding 
that success on the merits is not required to obtain 180 days of exclusivity by the first 
Paragraph IV filer). The system in place between 1998 and 2003 allowed an ANDA filer to 
certify its application under Paragraph IV, and then withdraw such certification and change 
it to Paragraph Ill, all without losing its period of exclusivity. Compare id. (requiring only 
the filing of Paragraph IV certification for 180-day exclusivity period) with MMA § 1102 
(codified in 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(Ill)) (imposing forfeiture of 180-day exclusivity 
period upon withdrawal of certification, as of 2003). The MMA changed that and now 
requires forfeiture of exclusivity if the Paragraph IV certification is wi1hdrawn. See Liu, 
supra note 44, at 453. This change in law, however, was not sufficient to preclude all 
reverse settlements. See infra Part IV.A. 
62. See Higgins & Graham, supra note 45, at 370 (contextualizing the costs of 
challenging a patent in relation to the larger "potential payoff' of $60 million in the first 180 
days). 
63. Matthew B. Zisk, Mediation and Settlement of Patent Disputes in the Shadow of the 
Public interest, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 481, 489 (1999). Although this figure is an 
estimate only, and is "based on anecdotal evidence or on only a few studies," it is largely in 
line with the settlement rate of other civil suits, which is about 85-90%.id. 
64. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 59, at 16. 
65.id. at 17 (stating that nine out of twenty settled cases, or 45%, involved payments 
from the patentee to the generic). This number may be an underestimate as noted by the 
Second Circuit in Ciprojloxacin 11, 604 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (notiug that "1here is 
evidence that the practice of entering into reverse exclusionary payment settlements has 
increased"). 
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Consequently, in the Hatch-Waxman litigation there are no damages 
(other than the cost oflitigation for each party) to be had. Yet under a 
reverse settlement the patentee often pays amounts far exceeding the 
cost of litigation to the challengers. 
While each settlement obviously has different terms, the general 
parameters are quite similar across all settlements. This Part outlines 
several settlements that have been subject to judicial challenges. The 
goal of this Part is not so much to describe every settlement in great 
detail, but to show the common features of reverse settlements. 
A. Cardizem 
One of the first reverse settlements - or at least one of the first 
that attracted significant public scrutiny - involved Cardizem CD, a 
brand-name prescription calcium channel blocker used to treat several 
heart ailments such as hypertension and angina. 66 Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc. held a patent directed towards the dissolution profile of 
Cardizem CD.67 Andrx Pharmaceuticals - a generic manufacturer-
filed an ANDA seeking to manufacture a generic equivalent of 
Cardizem CD and certified, under Paragraph IV, that none of the 
patents covering Cardizem CD would be infringed by its product. 68 
About a year after Andrx filed its initial application, the FDA issued 
preliminary approval and stated that final approval would issue once 
the thirty-month stay expired or the court ruled in favor of Andrx.69 
Almost immediately after the FDA issued the preliminary 
approval, Hoechst and Andrx entered into a settlement agreement.70 
The agreement provided that Hoechst (the patentee) would pay Andrx 
$40 million per year until Andrx received a final favorable court 
ruling.71 In exchange, Andrx agreed not to enter the market with its 
generic version of the drug until there was such a final unappealable 
ruling in its favor, even if the thirty-month stay expired prior to such a 
ruling.72 In other words, Andrx agreed to remain off the market even 
after receiving a final approval from the FDA (which would issue 
upon the expiration of the thirty-month period). Andrx also agreed not 
to waive its ISO-day exclusivity period.73 
Several pharmaceutical companies challenged the settlement as a 
violation of the antitrust laws and argued that, but for the agreement 
66. See La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (in re Cardizem CD 
Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896,901-02 (6th Cir. 2003). 
67.id. at 902. Hoechst also held a patent directed to the active ingredient in Cardizem 
(diltiazem hydrochloride); however, that patent expired in 1992.id. at 90 I. 
68.id. at 902. 
69.id. 
70.id. 
71. id. at 902 n.3. 
72. id. at 902. 
73.id. 
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between Hoechst and Andrx, the generic version would have come on 
the market earlier, and that the agreement "protected [Hoechst] from 
competition from both Andrx and other potential generic competitors 
because Andrx's delayed market entry postponed the start of its 180-
day exclusivity period.,,74 
The Sixth Circuit addressed the question of whether such an 
. . l' 75 lId d h' 76 agreement was a per se antitrust VI0 atlOn. t conc u e t at It was. 
In the court's view, the agreement "was, at its core, a horizontal 
agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD 
throughout the entire United States,,,77 because it "guaranteed to 
[Hoechst] that its only potential competitor at that time, Andrx, 
would ... refrain from marketing its generic version of Cardizem CD 
even after it had obtained FDA approval, protecting [Hoecht]'s 
exclusive access to the market" while simultaneously "delay[ing] the 
entry of other generic competitors, who could not enter until the 
expiration of Andrx's 180-day period of marketing exclusivity.,,78 
Because the court concluded that this was a classic horizontal 
agreement to restrain trade, it applied a per se rule and refused to 
consider any pro-competitive arguments advanced by Andrx and 
Hoechst. 79 
The same Cardizem settlement described above was also subject 
to litigation in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.8o The D.C. Circuit found that a "payment flowing from the 
innovator to the challenging generic firm may suggest strongly the 
anticompetitive intent of the parties in entering the agreement and the 
rent-preserving effect of that agreement.,,81 In the court's view, 
although Andrx was entitled to bar other generic manufacturers from 
entering the market under the 180-day exclusivity provision, "Andrx' s 
manipulation of the exclusivity period trigger date extended" its legal 
rights beyond those authorized by the Hatch-Waxman Act, and was 
therefore in violation of the antitrust laws.82 The court concluded that 
the agreement was a per se violation of the Sherman ACt. 83 
74.id. at 904. 
75.id. at 905-06. 
76.id. at 908. 
77.id. 
78.id. at 907. 
79.id. at 906-08. 
80. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp.lnt'!, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
81.id. at 809 (quoting David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust 
Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.1. 321, 335 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
82. Andrx, 256 F.3d at 810. 
83. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 915 (affirming the grant of"summary judgment [because] the 
defendants had committed a per se violation ofthe antitrust laws"). 
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B. Hytrin 
At about the same time as the Cardizem settlement litigation in 
the Sixth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit was considering Valley Drug 
Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 84 This case involved settlement 
agreements between several generic companies and Abbott 
Laboratories, which held a patent on Hytrin, a drug used to treat 
hypertension and prostate hyperplasia. 85 
Following the filing of an ANDA with a Paragraph IV 
certification by two generic companies, Abbott filed suits, eventually 
settling both cases.86 Both agreements required Abbott to pay several 
million dollars in exchange for the generics forbearing from market 
entry until a specified date, until some other generics firm 
successfully brought a generic equivalent of Hytrin to market, or until 
a final unappealable ruling holding the patents in question invalid.87 
Each settlement thus postponed the date of entry beyond the 30-month 
stay, but did not end the litigation between the generics and Abbott. 
Additionally, the generics agreed not to waive their ISO-day 
1 .. . d 88 exc USIVlty peno . 
Ultimately, Abbott lost the suit when the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the judgment of invalidity during an interlocutory appeal. 89 This 
outcome would have resulted in termination of the agreements but for 
the fact that they were terminated earlier in response to an 
investigation by the FTC.9o 
Following these events, a group of plaintiffs filed an antitrust 
action against Abbott, Geneva, and Zenith alleging that the 
agreements were a per se illegal restraint of trade in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman ACt.91 The Eleventh Circuit, in rejecting the 
per se approach, stated that "[i]f this case merely involved one firm 
making monthly payments to potential competitors in return for their 
exiting or refraining from entering the market, we would readily 
affirm the district court's order. This is not such a case, however, 
because one of the parties owned a patent."n The court reasoned that 
because patents carry with them the right to exclude, any agreements 
84.344 F.3d 1294 (lith Cir. 2003). 
85. See id. at 1298. Abbott's patent was directed to crystalline forms of terazosin 
hydrochloride, which is the active ingredient in Hytrin. As was the case with Cardizem, 
there also existed a patent on the terazosin hydrochloride itself, but it had expired by the 
time the first ANDAs were filed.ld. 
86. Id. at 1300-0 l. In both cases the generic companies conceded infringement and 
argued only that the patent was invalid.ld. 
87.1d. 
88.1d. at 1300. 
89. Id. at 130 l. 
90.1d. 
9l. Id. 
92.1d. at 1304. 
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that protect that right cannot be per se illegal, but must be analyzed in 
light of the patentee's right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the patented product.93 The court also observed that "[g]iven 
the asymmetries of risk and large profits at stake, even a patentee 
confident in the validity of its patent might pay a potential infringer a 
substantial sum in settlement.,,94 After additional years of litigation 
the case ultimately settled.95 
C. Tamoxifen 
In 2006, it was the Second Circuit's tum to review an alleged 
antitrust violation following a settlement between Zeneca, Inc. - a 
manufacturer of tamoxifen,96 a drug used in the treatment of breast 
cancer - and Barr Laboratories, a generic manufacturer that sought 
d .. f h' d 97 to pro uce a genenc versIOn 0 t IS rug. 
In response to Barr's Paragraph IV filing, Zeneca sued, but lost in 
the district court because the patent was ruled invalid, the 
consequence of intentional withholding of clinical test results.98 While 
the appeal was pending in the Federal Circuit, Zeneca and Barr 
entered into a settlement agreement.99 In return for payment and a 
non-exclusive license to manufacture tamoxifen, Barr agreed to 
withdraw its Paragraph IV certification and refile its ANDA with a 
Paragraph III certification, attesting that it would not market its own 
version of tamoxifen until Zeneca's patent expired. lOO Additionally, 
the parties agreed that should another lawsuit challenging Zeneca's 
tamoxifen patents be filed and result in an unappealable judgment that 
its patents are either invalid or not enforceable, Barr could default to 
its Paragraph IV certification. 101 In other words, if a third party were 
to prevail in its challenge to Zeneca's patents, Barr would be in the 
same position as it would have been had it prevailed in its own 
case. 102 Pursuant to the settlement, the district court's judgment of 
~ b'l' d 103 unenLorcea 1 Ity was vacate . . 
93.1d. at 1311. 
94.1d. at 1310. 
95. United Wis. Servs., Inc., v. Abbott Labs. (in re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litig.), No. 99MDL1317SElTZKLEIN, 2005 WL 2451960, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2005) 
(approving the settlement). 
96. Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (in re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187, 
193 (2d Cir. 2006). Zeneca marketed its version of tamoxifen under the brand name 
Nolvadex.ld. 
97.1d. at 190. 
98.1d. at 193. 
99.1d. 
100. Id. at 193-94. 
101.1d. at 194. This would, of course, permit Barr to reclaim its first filer status and with 
it the 180-day exclusivity period. 
102.1d. Recall that Zeneca and Barr settled while Zeneca's appeal of the unfavorable 
district court judgment was pending in the Federal Circuit. This case was settled before the 
298 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 24 
Subsequently, three other companies filed ANDAs with 
Paragraph IV certifications to produce a generic version of 
tamoxifen. l04 However, because of Barr's first filer status, no other 
manufacturer was able to enter the tamoxifen market until Barr 
h d . I' . . d 105 ex auste Its exc USIVlty peno . 
While the various claims on Zeneca's patent validity continued to 
be litigated, consumers filed an antitrust challenge to the Barr-Zeneca 
1993 agreement. 106 The plaintiffs alleged that the settlement 
agreement violated the antitrust laws because it enabled Zeneca's 
continuing monopolization of the market for tamoxifen by 
resurrecting a patent already adjudged to be invalid, thus stifling 
competition from other generic manufacturers. l07 Unlike the plaintiffs 
in Valley Drug and Cardizem litigation, though, the plaintiffs here did 
not push the theory that the settlements were per se illegal. Rather, 
they argued that the payments offered by Zeneca to Barr were 
"excessive" and therefore anti-competitive. 108 
The Second Circuit disagreed. The court conceded that "even if 
reverse payments are a natural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman 
process, it does not follow that they are necessarily lawful.,,109 
Nevertheless, the court "doubt[ ed] the wisdom of deeming a patent 
effectively invalid on the basis of a patent holder's fear of losing 
it.,,110 Thus, according to the court, the patent remained valid and gave 
the authority to the patent holder to exclude others from the market. 
Consequently, unless a court finds that "the exclusionary effects of the 
agreement exceed the scope of the patent's protection" the agreement 
must be found to be within the patentee's rights and therefore not a 
violation of the antitrust laws. 111 In short, because Zeneca's patent 
was not finally adjudged to have been invalid or unenforceable, in the 
Second Circuit's view, Zeneca had a right to continue its monopoly. 
Judge Pooler dissented, arguing for a less deferential totality-of-
the-circumstances standard,ll2 rather than the majority's standard of 
"absent an extension of the monopoly beyond the patent's scope ... 
Supreme Court decided u.s. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 
18 (1994), which held that appellate courts should not vacate judgments below in the face of 
a settlement. Consequently, Zeneca was able to convince the Federal Circuit to vacate the 
unfavorable district court judgment and avoid the preclusive effect of the unenforceability 
finding. 
103. Imperial Chern. Indus., PLC v. Heumann Pharma GmbH & Co., 991 F.2d 811 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision). 
104. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 194-95. 
105.1d. at 195. 
106. Id. at 196. 
107.1d. at 196-97. 
108.1d. at 208. 
109.1d. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
llO.1d. at 210. 
111.1d. at 212-13 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
l12.1d. at 228 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
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and absent fraud.,,113 While Judge Pooler was not prepared to declare 
such settlements illegal per se - a theory that was not advanced by 
the plaintiffs - she argued that the case ought to be remanded to the 
district court for further fact-finding in light of the standard she 
proposed.114 
D. Ciprofloxacin I 
The Federal Circuit, which has near-exclusive jurisdiction over 
the patent laws, also addressed the legality of reverse settlements in 
the context of Hatch-Waxman litigation. The case involved a 
settlement between Bayer, a German pharmaceutical manufacturer 
that held a patent on the active ingredient in ciprofloxacin, and Barr 
Laboratories. ll5 Bayer filed suit in response to Barr's filing of ANDA 
with a certification that Bayer's patent was both invalid due to 
obviousness and unenforceable due to the patentee's inequitable 
conduct before the Patent Office. 116 
In a pre-trial settlement, Barr dropped its challenge and agreed to 
convert its Paragraph IV certification to a Paragraph III certification, 
in exchange for payments from Bayer totaling $398.1 million, 
including a $49.1 million initial payout. ll7 Following the settlement, 
Barr and Bayer entered into a consent judgment where Barr admitted 
infringement and the patent's validity and enforceability.118 
113.1d. at 213 (majority opinion). 
114.1d. at 232 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
115. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (in re Ciprofioxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.) (Ciprojloxacin 1), 544 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
Ciprofioxacin is an antibiotic used to treat a variety of bacterial infections. The antibiotic 
was in the news in 2002 when several anthrax-laden letters were sent out to a number of 
U.S. officials. Ciprofioxacin, which Bayer markets under the trade name Cipro, is the only 
drug that can treat anthrax infection. See Jennifer A. Lazo, Note, The Life-Saving Medicines 
Export Act: Why the Proposed u.s. Compulsory Licensing Scheme Will Fail To Export Any 
Medicines or Save Any Lives, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 237, 248-49 (2007) (noting that Cipro 
is "the only anthrax antibiotic [approved by 1 the U.S. Food and Drug Administration"). 
Needless to say, the patent on this drug is quite valuable. See Robert H. Trudell, Food 
Security Emergencies and the Power of Eminent Domain: A Domestic Legal Tool to Treat a 
Global Problem, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 277, 317 (2005) ("Bayer is reported to 
earn $1 billion per year on Cipro. "). 
116. See Ciprojloxacin 1, 544 F.3d at 1328. 
117.1d. at 1328-29 & n.5. Under a separate supply agreement, Bayer could supply Barr 
with Bayer-made ciprofioxacin or make quarterly payments to Barr. 1d. at 1329. Bayer also 
entered into agreements covering Hoechst, Rugby, and Apotex, another generic drug 
manufacturer that is controlled by Barr's principal shareholder. See id. at 1327-28. 
118.1d. at 1329. In 1997, Bayer filed for patent reexamination with the Patent Office, 
during which some of the original claims were cancelled and some were amended, and 
mutatis mutandis, the patent was reaffirmed. Following the reissue, four more generic 
companies filed Paragraph IV certification on the reissued patent. Bayer sued each of the 
companies and prevailed in three of the suits, while the fourth one was dismissed when the 
company withdrew the Paragraph IV certification. See id. 
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In 2000 and 200 I, several plaintiffs filed suit against Bayer 
alleging, inter alia, that Bayer's settlement violated the antitrust laws 
under the Walker Process l19 doctrine and that "Bayer unlawfully 
monopolized the ciprofloxacin market in violation of state antitrust 
laws by enforcing a patent obtained by fraud. Specifically, they 
alleged that Bayer violated state antitrust and/or consumer protection 
laws through fraud on the PTO and sham litigation in enforcing 
the ... patent against Barr.,,120 The plaintiffs also alleged that the 
settlement "constituted an illegal market allocation in violation of the 
prohibition on contracts in restraint of trade contained in sections I 
and 2 of the Sherman Act and in violation of various state antitrust 
and consumer protection laws.,,121 
In rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments, the Federal Circuit held that 
"[ s ]ettlement of patent claims by agreement between the parties-
including exchange of consideration - rather than by litigation is not 
precluded by the Sherman Act even though it may have some adverse 
effects on competition.,,122 The court noted that "a sizable exclusion 
payment from the patent holder to the generic manufacturer is not 
unexpected under the Hatch-Waxman Act, where the relative risks of 
litigation are redistributed.,,123 The court stated that the "essence of 
the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition beyond the 
exclusionary zone of the patent," and concluded that "in the absence 
of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation, the court need 
not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a 
settlement agreement involving a reverse payment.,,124 Importantly, 
the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that one must "evaluate the 
strength of the patent in determining whether reverse payments are 
unlawful.,,125 Accordingly, the court rejected the notion that in 
evaluating reverse settlements, an "analysis of patent validity is 
appropriate in the absence of fraud or sham litigation.,,126 
119. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chern. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-
78 (1965) (holding that enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may 
be a violation of the Sherman Act). 
120. Ciprojloxacin 1,544 F.3d at 1330. 
121.1d. at 1329. 
122.1d. at 1333. 
123.1d. at 1333 n.l1. 
124.1d. at 1336. 
125. See id. at 1334-35. 
126.1d. at 1337. 
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E. Ciprofloxacin II 
In the part of the ciprofloxacin case that remained with the 
Second Circuit,127 the panel ruled that it was constrained by the prior 
panel's ruling in Tamoxifen, and therefore declined to adopt a per se 
rule against the reverse settlements.128 The panel, however, went to 
great lengths to disparage the reasoning of Tamoxifen. 129 At the end of 
its opinion, the panel stated that it "believe[ s] there are compelling 
reasons to revisit Tamoxifen with the benefit of the full Court's 
consideration of the difficult questions at issue and the important 
interests at stake. [The panel] therefore invite [ s] the plaintiffs-
appellants to petition for rehearing in banc.,,130 Despite the panel's 
invitation, the Second Circuit declined to reconsider its 
jurisprudence. l3l Nonetheless, at least three judges on that court are 
now on record - through their opinion in this case - expressing 
their views that reverse settlements are likely illegal as a matter of 
antitrust law. 
F. Schering-Plough 
The government directly challenged a reverse settlement between 
a brand-name manufacturer and a generic in one case: Schering-
Plough Corp. v. FTC, heard by the Eleventh Circuit in 2005. 132 It is 
the reasoning of this case that was adopted by the Federal Circuit and 
the Second Circuit, in the Ciprofloxacin I and Tamoxifen cases, 
respectively.133 Because of the government's involvement, this case 
also figures prominently in the debates over the propriety of reverse 
settlements. 134 
The dispute in Schering-Plough concerned a coating for 
potassium chloride. 135 The pill was marketed under the brand name K-
127. See Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (Ciprojloxacin I/), 604 
F.3d 98, 103 n.lO (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that only Walker Process claims were transferred 
to the Federal Circuit, as the resolution of those claims depended on issues of patent law). 
128. See id. at 106. 
129. See id. at 108-10. 
130.Id. at 110. 
13!. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(denying petition to rehear the case en banc). This decision, however, should not be 
necessarily taken as an indication that the rest of the Second Circuit agrees with the panel's 
decision. The Second Circuit is notorious for declining to sit en banc even in the most 
extraordinary cases. See, e.g., Ricci v. Destefano, 530 F.3d 88, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(Katzmann, 1., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
132.402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005). 
133. See Ciprojloxacin 1,544 F.3d 1323, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 10blove v. Barr Labs. 
Inc. (in re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187,202 (2d Cir. 2006). 
134. A quick Lexis search conducted on March 26, 2011 revealed that this case was cited 
in 105 law review articles, 37 treatises, and 35 judicial decisions. 
135. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1058. The active ingredient itself; potassium chloride, 
is a common salt and obviously unpatentable. Id. Schering, however, held a patent (with an 
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Dur and was used as a supplement for treatment of high blood 
pressure and/or congestive heart failure. 136 Two generics filed an 
ANDA certifying that Schering's patent on the coating was invalid 
and unenforceable,137 and Schering sued for infringement. 138 Prior to 
trial, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, in which 
Schering agreed to multi-million dollar payments to generics in 
exchange for the generics' agreement to split the patent term with 
Schering and license to Schering some of their own intellectual 
property.139 As expected, the generics agreed not to waive or transfer 
the ISO-day exclusivity period. 140 
The FTC filed a complaint against all of the parties, alleging that 
the agreements were "illegal agreements in restraint of trade, in 
violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 
U.S.c. § 45, and in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.c. § 1.,,141 The full Commission did not hold that the settlements 
were illegal per se; rather, it concluded that Schering paid the 
challengers in order to delay the entry of the generic products onto the 
market,142 and that such delay injures competition and consumers: 
[T]he Commission prohibited settlements under 
which the generic receives anything of value and 
agrees to defer its own research, development, 
production or sales activities. Nevertheless, the 
Commission carved out one arbitrary exception for 
payments to the generic: beyond a "simple 
compromise" to the entry date, if payments can be 
linked to litigation costs (not to exceed $2 million), 
and the Commission is notified of the settlement, 
then the parties need not worry about a later antitrust 
attack. 143 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the FTC's finding, holding that 
"the Commission manufactured a rule that would make almost any 
expiration date in 2006) on the pill's coating that allowed for extended release of the active 
ingredient. Id. 
136.1d. 
137.1d. at 1059 n.2, 1060 n.5. 
138. See id. at 1058-60. 
139.1d. at 1083. 
140. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1084 (2003) nT]he settlement 
agreement between Schering and Upsher-Smith preserved a barrier to generic competition 
to K-Dur 20."). 
141. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1061. The FTC also claimed that Schering 
"monopolized and conspired to monopolize the potassium supplement market." Id. 
142. Id. at 1062. The Commission concluded that payments that Schering made in order 
to obtain licenses from Upsher and ESI did not represent legitimate consideration for those 
licenses.ld. 
143.1d. 
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settlement involving a payment illegal," directly contrary to the 
court's opinion in Valley Drug. 144 The court concluded: 
[T]he size of the payment, or the mere presence of a 
payment, should not dictate the availability of a 
settlement remedy. Due to the asymmetries [sic] of 
risk and large profits at stake, even a patentee 
confident in the validity of its patent might pay a 
potential infringer a substantial sum in settlement. 
An exception cannot lie, as the Commission might 
think, when the issue turns on validity (Valley Drug) 
as opposed to infringement (the Schering 
agreements). The effect is the same: a generic's entry 
into the market is delayed. What we must focus on is 
the extent to which the exclusionary effects of the 
agreement fall within the scope of the patent's 
. 145 protectIOn. 
G. Provigil 
As the volume of criticism of bare cash payments from brand-
name manufacturers to generic challengers has increased, companies 
have become more creative in structuring these settlements. Two 
recent cases exemplify the new complexities involved in reverse 
settlements. 
In early 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania considered a reverse settlement agreement between 
Cephalon - a holder of a patent on Provigil- and four generic 
companies. 146 Although the court's oplllIOn only addressed 
Cephalon's motion to dismiss,147 it is instructive of the court's views 
on reverse settlements. 
Cephalon's patent did not cover the active ingredient in Provigil, 
but instead was directed to the particle size of the active ingredient. 148 
Four generic manufacturers filed an ANDA for the generic version of 
Provigil, and all four certified that the patent was either invalid or 
would not be infringed. 149 Ultimately, Cephalon entered into a 
144.1d. at 1075. 
145.1d. at 1075-76 (footnote & citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146. See King Drug Co. of Florence v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 
2010). 
147.1d. at 517. 
148. Id. at 521. 
149.1d. The MMA allows for multiple "first filers" to share the 180-day exclusivity 
period. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(1l)(bb) (West 2011) (defining "first applicant" as 
any applicant that submits a "substantially complete" application "on the first day on which 
a[nother] substantially complete application" was submitted); John M. Rebman, Dr. Strange 
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settlement with each challenger, involving large payments in 
exchange for an agreement that the generic would manufacture the 
active ingredient in Provigil and sell it back to Cephalon at a fixed 
price. 150 The agreements also called for a number of cross-licenses 
between Cephalon and each generic. 151 Each of the generics agreed 
not to market their own version of Pro vigil until a certain agreed-upon 
date. 152 As usual, the generics also agreed not to relinquish the lSO-
day exclusivity period. 153 
The district court, in denying Cephalon's motion to dismiss 
various antitrust claims by the FTC and other plaintiffs, concluded 
that the settlement may have enlarged the scope of the patent, and 
therefore that additional proceedings were in order. 154 It thus appears 
that, in further adjudications, the district court will be tasked with 
evaluating the patent's validity, enforceability, and scope for the 
purposes of infringement - the very determinations that the 
settlements sought to avoid. The appeal will then likely lie with the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, rather than the Federal 
Circuit. 155 Thus, plaintiffs such as the FTC, who have little 
understanding of-or interest in - the intricacies of patent law,156 
will be litigating the case, and judges who have little experience in 
adjudicating patent disputes will be deciding it. This is far from an 
ideal outcome. 157 
Thus, the basic parameters of a reverse settlement are these: In 
exchange for a payment of significant sums of money from the 
patentee to the challenger, the challenger agrees to forbear from 
entering the market. The challenger generally agrees to preserve and 
not transfer its ISO-day exclusivity period, and the patentee agrees to 
split the life of the patent with the challenger. Agreements may be 
complicated and payments obscured by the challenger licensing some 
of its own intellectual property to the patentee. These licenses make it 
drastically harder to figure out whether the payments are being made 
simply to induce the generic to delay market entry, or whether they 
Drug, or: How 1 Learned To Stop Worrying and Love Authorized Generics, 12 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CAREL. 159,166-67 (2009). 
150. King Drug, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 522-23. 
l51.1d. 
l52.1d. at 522. 
l53.1d. at 530. 
l54.1d. at 533-36. 
155. Cj id. at 534-35 (noting that similar appeals in Valley Drug went from the District 
Court to the Eleventh Circuit). 
156.1 do not suggest that the attorneys at the FTC (or the commissioners) are somehow 
not capable enough to understand patent law. However, patent law is not the FTC's primary 
concern - antitrust law is. For this reason, 1 do not expect the FTC to be particularly 
alarmed if, in pursuing better antitrust outcomes, it creates worse patent law outcomes. 
157. Such an appellate route would run counter to the congressional intent of creating 
uniformity in patent law. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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constitute consideration for the licenses. This difficulty, III turn, 
significantly clouds the antitrust analysis. 
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, JUDICIAL, AND ACADEMIC 
RESPONSE 
With the number of reverse settlements between generic and 
brand-name manufacturers increasing,158 it is no surprise that the issue 
has not escaped the attention of politicians, judges, and academics. 
This Part reviews these groups' reactions to the reverse settlements. 
A. The Legislative Reaction 
The legislative branch has been particularly unhappy with reverse 
settlements and the judicial tolerance thereof. While no explicit ban 
on reverse settlements has been enacted, a number of such bills have 
been proposed. 
The first efforts to address reverse settlements began in 2002 
when the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Drug Competition Act 
of 200 1,159 which required all settlements between generic and brand-
name manufacturers involving agreements over "the manufacture, 
marketing or sale of the brand name drug ... [or] of the generic drug" 
or "the ISO-day [exclusivity] period" to be disclosed to both the FTC 
and the DOl. 160 Ultimately, a version of this bill was incorporated into 
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act of 2003. 161 The Act, however, conferred no new enforcement 
authority on either the FTC or the DOl. Indeed, the only purpose of 
the bill seems to have been "to enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the enforcement of the antitrust laws,,162 which was to be 
accomplished "by providing timely notice.,,163 Given the consistent 
judicial rejection of the FTC's attempts to rein in reverse settlements 
under the present antitrust law, it is rather hard to see how this Act 
would achieve its stated goal of "enhanc[ing] the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the enforcement of the antitrust and competition laws"l64 
beyond the pre-2003 status quo. 
Other proposed remedies go much further. In the 109th, 1 10th, 
and III th Congresses, Senator Herb Kohl (together with between four 
and nine co-sponsors from both parties) introduced the Preserve 
158. See supra note 65. 
159. S. 754, 107th Congo (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 20,2002). 
160.1d. § 5(a)(2). 
161. MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111-18, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
162. S. 754 § 3. 
163.1d. 
164.1d. 
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Access to Affordable Generics ACt. 165 The Act would make it 
unlawful for the brand-name manufacturer and the generic ANDA 
filer to enter into any agreement where (i) "an ANDA filer receives 
anything of value," and (ii) "the ANDA filer agrees not to research, 
develop, manufacture, market, or sell the ANDA product for any 
period of time.,,166 The 109th and 1 10th Congress versions of the bill 
contained no exceptions to the ban.167 In the newest version, Senator 
Kohl's bill would only make two exemptions. First, any payments, not 
to exceed $7,500,000, meant to reimburse the ANDA filer "for 
reasonable litigation expenses" would not be covered by the 
prohibition. 168 Second, the settlements would be presumptively 
unlawful and anti-competitive, but the settling parties would be 
permitted to rebut the presumption "if the parties to such agreement 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the pro-
competitive benefits of the agreement outweigh the anti-competitive 
effects of the agreement.,,169 In deciphering whether or not the parties 
have carried their burden, the trier of fact would be able to consider: 
(1) the length of time remaining until the end of 
the life of the relevant patent, compared with 
the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA 
product; 
(2) the value to consumers of the competition 
from the ANDA product allowed under the 
agreement; 
(3) the form and amount of consideration received 
by the ANDA filer in the agreement resolving 
or settling the patent infringement claim; 
(4) the revenue the ANDA filer would have 
received by winning the patent litigation; 
(5) the reduction in the NDA holder's revenues if 
it had lost the patent litigation; 
(6) the time period between the date of the 
agreement conveying value to the ANDA filer 
and the date of the settlement of the patent 
infringement claim; and 
165. S. 369, lllth Congo (as introduced in Senate, Feb. 3,2009); S. 316, 110th Congo (as 
introduced in Senate, Jan. 17, 2007); S. 3582, 109th Congo (as introduced in Senate, June 
27,2006). 
166. S. 369 § 3; S. 316 § 3; S. 3582 § 2. 
167. S. 316 § 3; S. 3582 § 2. 
168. S. 369, lllth Congo § 3(d)(2) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 15, 
2009). 
169.1d. § 3(a)(2). 
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(7) any other factor that the fact finder, in its 
discretion, deems relevant to its determination 
of competitive effects under this subsection. 170 
307 
Similar legislation has been introduced in the House of 
Representatives. In the 11 Oth Congress, Representatives Bobby Rush 
and Henry Waxman introduced two separate, yet nearly identical bills 
each of which would flatly prohibit reverse settlements. l7l 
Representative Rush introduced an identical bill in the III th 
Congress. 172 These proposals would brook no exception to the flat ban 
on reverse settlements. 173 While most of these bills have been 
languishing in committees, the House did take up a version identical 
to the latest Senate bill, and passed it as part of the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 20 1 0.174 The provision, however, was removed 
in the Senate. 175 
These legislative efforts, though mostly unsuccessful thus far, are 
predicated on several proposed congressional findings, some of which 
are debatable. For instance, the Waxman bill states that prohibiting 
settlements would ultimately result in "lower prices [and] greater 
innovation,,,176 and that as a result "settlements which include a 
payment from a brand name manufacturer to a generic manufacturer 
to delay entry by generic drugs are anti-competitive and contrary to 
the interests of consumers.,,177 That is a debatable proposition, for if 
banning the settlements would simply result in longer, more 
protracted litigation, prices may well increase.178 Additionally, 
innovation may suffer if companies are unable to protect their 
financial investments by avoiding the vagaries of litigation.179 The 
170.Id. 
171. H.R. 1902, 110th Congo (as introduced by Rep. Rush, Apr. 17,2007); H.R. 1432, 
110th Congo [hereinafter Waxman Bill] (as introduced by Rep. Waxman, Mar. 9, 2007). 
Congressman Waxman co-sponsored Congressman Rush's bill. H.R. 1902. 
172. H.R. 1706, Illth Congo (as introduced by Rep. Rush, Mar. 25, 2009). 
173. See id. § 2. 
174. See H.R. 4899, l1lth Congo §§ 4201-07 (2010) (House Amendment to the Senate 
Amendment), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo .gov Icgi-bin/getdoc.cgiry 
dbname= 111_ cong_ bills&docid=f:h489geah.txt. pdf 
175. Compare Supplement Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-212, 124 Stat. 
2302 (missing Title IV ofthe House bill), with H.R. 4899 §§ 4201-07. 
176. Waxman Bill, supra note 171, § 2(a)(5). 
177.Id. § 2(a)(11). 
178. See Andrew Kopelman, Note, Addressing Questionable Business Method Patents 
Prior to Issuance: A Two-Part Proposal, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2391, 2403-04 (2006) 
(noting that the costs of the litigation are passed on to the public in the form of increased 
prices). 
179. See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for 
Presumptive lllegality, 108 MICH. L. REv. 37, 62 (2009) (stating that "'the caustic 
environment of patent litigation' could reduce innovation by increasing the 'uncertainty 
around the drug manufacturer's ability to research, develop, and market the patented 
product.'" (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. V. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (lith Cir. 2005»). 
308 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 24 
latest Kohl bill - which was adopted almost verbatim by the 
House1SO - also rests on questionable findings. That bill suggests that 
"the intent of the 1984 [Hatch-Waxman] Act has been subverted by 
certain settlement agreements between brand companies and their 
potential generic competitors that make 'reverse payments' which are 
payments by the brand company to the generic company,,,ISI and that 
such agreements "unduly delayed the marketing of low-cost generic 
d "IS2 rugs. 
Of course, it is unclear whether the Hatch-Waxman Act has been 
"subverted" by agreements that would permit a generic to enter the 
market prior to the patent's expiration without the need to actually 
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the invalidity of the NDA 
holder's patent. It could be just as plausibly argued that such 
settlements advance the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act, especially 
when the settlements permit generics to enter the market prior to the 
expiration date of a valid patent. Similarly, one cannot say that the 
entry of the generics is unduly delayed absent some showing that but 
for these settlements, the ANDA filers would have prevailed at trial 
and been able to enter the market earlier. None of this is to say that 
Representative Waxman and Senator Kohl are necessarily wrong in 
their assessment 0 f reverse settlements' impact. What I am suggesting 
is that the proposed "findings" are, without additional support, 
questionable. 
The problem is that Congress continues to see these settlements 
as an antitrust issue. Therefore, legislative proposals remain open to 
the same line of intellectual attack as the FTC's position.1S3 The 
approach proposed infra in Part V avoids this problem. 
Before proceeding further, it should be observed that Congress 
was successful in enacting legislation that essentially eliminated some 
types of settlements. In 2003, as part of the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, Congress passed two 
provisions affecting reverse settlements. First, Congress enacted 
forfeiture provisions for the 180-day exclusivity period. Under the 
new version of the law, the generic manufacturer can no longer retain 
180. Compare S. 369, lllth Congo § 3(d)(2) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Oct. 15,2009), with H.R. 1902, 110th Congo (as introduced by Rep. Rush, Apr. 17,2007), 
and Waxman Bill, supra note 171. 
181. S. 369, lllth Congo § 2(a)(6)(A) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 
15,2009). 
l82.1d. § 2(a)(6)(B) (emphasis added). 
183. Of course, courts have rejected the FTC's stance based on the law as it currently 
stands. See supra Parts 1l1.B-F. Congress has the advantage of changing the law and forcing 
the courts to apply the new rules, even if the courts think that such rules rest on questionable 
economic or intellectual analysis. But that is a question of raw power, and does not address 
the question of whether such an approach actually best preserves the balance between 
favoring litigation settlements and protecting consumers from the collusive effects of such 
settlements. 
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the exclusivity period if, inter alia, it withdraws the Paragraph IV 
certification.184 Under this new rule, the generics in the Ciprofloxacin 
and tamoxifen settlements would have lost their exclusivity periods, 
thus making these settlements much less worthwhile than before 
2003.185 
Congress also mandated forfeiture of exclusivity whenever the 
ANDA filer enters into any agreement with respect to the filing that is 
ultimately adjudged to be a violation of antitrust laws. 186 In order to 
permit the policing of such agreements, Congress enacted a second 
provision - requiring the parties who enter into a reverse settlement 
to file copies of the agreement with the FTC.187 
The 2003 Act, however, does not eliminate reverse settlements.188 
Even the forfeiture provisions may be circumvented simply by parties 
structuring their settlements differently, such that the generic firm 
does not withdraw its Paragraph IV certification. Companies remain 
free to enter into settlements that "divide the life" of a patent while 
recognizing the patent's validity, enforceability, and infringement. 189 
B. The Executive Reaction 
If the Congressional response to the problem of reverse 
settlements has been halting and cautious, the Executive's response 
has been downright schizophrenic. Two agencies charged with 
enforcing antitrust laws have come to divergent conclusions about the 
legality of reverse settlements. The FTC took a hard line, adopting an 
approach that would have made all such settlements illegal per se in 
all but name. 190 As described above, the FTC attempted to adopt a 
rule that would bar all payments to the generic manufacturers that 
were the greater of $2 million or actual litigation expenses. That rule 
was rej ected by the 11 th Circuit. 191 The FTC, however, continued to 
press its view in the Supreme Court, seeking certiorari in Schering-
Plough, and in other courts of appeal. l92 Despite being rejected III 
184.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(Ill) (West 2011). 
185. Recall that the generic applicants in the Ciprofioxacin and tamoxifen settlements 
agreed to withdraw their Paragraph IV certifications and replace them with Paragraph III 
certifications. See supra notes 100, 117 and accompanying text. 
186.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V). 
187. MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
188. Cf Ciprojloxacin 11, 604 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that since 2005 there 
have been at least twenty reverse settlements). 
189. Such recognition could be embodied in a settlement decree entered by a court. Faced 
with such a decree, a generic would not be able to launch its product, but also might not be 
required to withdraw the Paragraph IV certification. 
190. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1061-62 (lith Cir. 2005) 
(describing FTC's position); see also supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
191. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065. 
192. FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (order denying certiorari). 
While the FTC sought certiorari, the DOJ, through the Solicitor General, opposed the 
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nearly every court, the FTC continues to adhere to this view. 193 For 
instance, Jon Leibowitz, the newly appointed chairman of the 
Commission, recently stated that "eliminating these deals is one of the 
Federal Trade Commission's highest priorities.,,194 In the same 
statement, the Chairman also announced the FTC's support for the 
congressional bills described in the preceding subsection. 195 
On the other hand, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ until 
recently took a very different approach. When the FTC filed its 
petition for a writ of certiorari in Schering-Plough, the DOJ opposed 
the grant and in its separate brief argued that "the mere presence of a 
reverse payment in the Hatch-Waxman context is not sufficient to 
establish that the settlement is unlawful. Rather, an appropriate legal 
standard should take into account the relative likelihood of success of 
the parties' claims, viewed ex ante."I96 
Recently, however, the DOJ executed a complete about-face with 
respect to its view of reverse settlements' validity. On July 6, 2009, 
the Justice Department filed an amicus brief with the Second Circuit 
in the Ciprofloxacin II case,197 and for the first time asserted that 
reverse settlements "should be treated as presumptively unlawful 
under Section 1 of the Sherman ACt.,,198 The new position would 
subject these settlements to a rule of reason analysis, and would 
permit the defendant to rebut the presumption of illegality upon 
showing that the "terms of the settlement did not impose[] an 
unreasonable restraint on competition, m view of their 
petition. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 
U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f216300/ 
216358.pdf 
193. The FTC pressed its position in an amicus brief to the Federal Circuit Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission, Ciprojloxacin 1, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(No. 2008-1097), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/2008/01/080129cipro.pdf The Federal 
Circuit rejected the FTC's approach. Ciprojloxacin 1, 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
The FTC also filed amicus briefs in the Second Circuit Brief Amicus Curiae of Federal 
Trade Commission, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F. 3d 98 (2d 
Cir. 20 I 0) (No. 05-2851-cv(L)), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/20 I 0/05/ 
051202amicuscarpentershealth.pdf; Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission, 
Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 
2006) (No. 03-7641), available at http://www.fic.gov /os/2005/12/051202amicustamoxifen 
.pdf The Second Circuit also rejected the FTC's views. Ciprojloxacin 11,604 F.3d 98, 105 
(2d Cir. 2010); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d 187,208 (2d Cir. 2006). 
194. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address at the Center for American 
Progress: "Pay-for-Delay" Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can 
Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers' Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care 
Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) I (June 23, 2009), available at http://www.fic.gov/ 
speeches/leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf 
195.1d. at 5 (stating that the FTC "strongly supports legislation to eliminate pay-for-
delay deals"). 
196. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 192, at II 
197. Ciprojloxacin 11,604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010). 
198. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Invitation at 10, Ciprojloxacin 
11,604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-2851-cv(L)), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
cases/f24 7700/24 7708.pdf 
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contemporaneous evaluations of the likelihood of an invalidity 
judgment.,,199 This position is still more generous to the settling 
parties than what the FTC would prefer, but it is a stark reversal from 
the previous position that essentially endorsed the Eleventh Circuit's 
approach in Schering-Plough. 
Additionally, it is likely that the DO] position will continue 
evolving toward a more restrictive view. President Obama, during his 
service as a U.S. Senator, was a co-sponsor of Senator Kohl's bill that 
sought to ban reverse settlements altogether.2oo Indeed, President 
Obama's sponsorship of that bill was cited by Mr. Leibowitz as 
evidence that the executive branch is committed to increased and 
. .. 1 201 G' h h Ob aggressive actlOn agalllst reverse sett ements. iven t at t e ama 
Administration generally takes a much stricter view of what 
constitutes permissible conduct under antitrust laws than its 
predecessor,202 and given the Administration's intense focus on health 
care issues, it is quite reasonable to expect that it will amplity its 
antitrust-grounded objections to settlements between brand-name and 
generic drug manufacturers in the context of Hatch-Waxman 
litigation. 
C. The Judicial Response 
Not much more needs to be said about the judicial response to 
reverse settlements beyond what was noted in Part III, supra. 
However, as more reverse settlements are entered into, more courts, at 
both the district and appellate levels, will have to wrestle with the 
antitrust issues such settlements raise. It is worth remembering that 
the majority of circuits have not yet had an opportunity to opine on 
the issue of reverse settlements. Their turn may yet come,203 possibly 
leading to further debate - and perhaps confusion. 
199.id. at 28 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
200. See S. 316, 110th Congo (as introduced in Senate, Jan. 17,2007). For a list of co-
sponsors, see Thomas, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ 
LegislativeData.phpry&n=Browse&c=110 (last visited May 6, 2011). 
201. See Leibowitz, supra note 194. 
202. See. e.g., Corporate Reform in America: A Chill in the Boardroom, THE 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2009, at 69-70, available at http://www.economist.com/node/ 
15065509rystorLid=15065509 nT]he Department of Justice has promised to be more 
aggressive in its enforcement of antitrust laws."); Editorial, Music inc. Gets Bigger, N.Y. 
TiMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010102109/0pinion/ 
09tue2.html (stating that the Obama administration's "Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission have become more aggressive about questioning mergers and 
challenging monopolies and anticompetitive behavior"). 
203. The most obvious candidate for the next court to opine on the matter is the Third 
Circuit, as it will hear the appeal, if any, of the Provigil case. Furthermore, the Third Circuit 
is home to Johnson & Johnson, Wyeth, and Merck, which are all headquartered in New 
Jersey. Other circuits may face these questions as well. For instance, Abbott Laboratories is 
headquartered in Illinois and Eli Lilly is in Indiana (both in the Seventh Circuit), Amgen 
and Genentech are in California (in the Ninth Circuit), and other companies are similarly 
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D. The Academic Debate 
The dispute over the proper antitrust treatment of reverse 
settlements has not escaped the academic world either. Much like the 
political establishment, the academic world is split on the question of 
whether these settlements can ever be anything other than anti-
competitive, and, if so, under what conditions. 
At one extreme lie Mr. Cristo fer Leffler and Professor Keith 
Leffler, who argue that all reverse settlements should be per se 
illegal.204 According to Messrs. Leffler: 
[A] patent enjoys only a rebuttable, not a conclusive 
presumption of validity. This probability of 
invalidity has an economic value. Under the system 
as created by Congress, the challenger has an 
incentive to capture that value and that incentive 
creates consumer benefit. In contrast, a payment by 
the patent holder to the challenger captures the value 
of the probability of patent invalidity. The agreement 
between the patent holder and the challenger divides 
the profits from agreed validity and thereby 
eliminates any consumer benefit. Through an 
agreement not to compete, the patent holder changes 
the congressionally mandated rebuttable 
presumption of validity into a conclusive 
presumption. When a patent holder thus enlarges the 
reward granted to him by Congress, in the form of 
paying a potential rival to confess validity, he and his 
co-conspirator reduce efficiency and consumer 
welfare and therefore commit a per se violation of 
the antitrust laws?05 
spread throughout the nation and various judicial circuits. It is quite possible, given the 
location of these various companies, that the local circuit courts will yet have a chance to 
opine on any deals that these companies may enter into. 
204. See Cristofer Leffler & Keith Leffler, Settling the Controversy over Patent 
Settlements: Payments by the Patent Holder Should Be Per Se JIlegal, in ANTITRUST LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 475 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004). 
205.Id. at 491; see also Herbert Hovenkamp et aI., Anticompetitive Settlement of 
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1719, 1759 (2003) (arguing that reverse 
settlements should be treated as unlawful if the amount of settlement is greater than "the 
expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit;' essentially adopting 
the FTC's per se rule); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. 
ECON. 391, 407-08 (2003) (stating that "a naked cash payment flowing from the 
patentholder to the challenger (in excess of avoided litigation costs) is a clear signal that the 
settlement is likely to be anticompetitive," and that "the FTC has a sound basis for its 
skepticism about 'reverse cash payments' from the patentholder to the challenger"). 
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Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro take a similar approach, without 
explicitly calling for a per se prohibition.206 Lemley and Shapiro argue 
that patents do not, as conventionally thought, grant "the right to 
exclude but rather a right to try to exclude.,,207 According to this 
thinking, unless a patentee obtains a court order allowing him to 
exclude a competitor by proving that the competitor is infringing a 
valid patent, an agreement that excludes that competitor both enlarges 
the scope of the patent and increases harm to consumers.208 Lemley 
and Shapiro do suggest that agreements to delay entry unaccompanied 
by a reverse payment may indeed be pro-competitive,209 which may 
be somewhat at odds with how the FTC would view these agreements. 
On balance, though, the Lemley and Shapiro approach is similar to the 
position espoused by Messrs. Leffler. 
Professor Michael Carrier takes a somewhat more moderate 
approach.2lO His approach is very similar to the one proposed by the 
DO] in its Second Circuit brief in the Ciprofloxacin II case. Professor 
Carrier argues that while a complete ban on reverse settlements is 
over-inclusive and prohibits lawful activity,211 allowing unchecked (or 
nearly unchecked) reverse settlements is under-inclusive and permits 
unlawful restraints on trade?12 In order to balance these 
considerations, and taking into account Hatch-Waxman's 
competition-promoting goals and regulatory structure, Carrier 
suggests that the payments by brand names to generics should be 
presumptively illegal,213 but that the patentee be given an opportunity 
to show, by "introduc[ing] arguments that have been offered in the 
economic literature,,214 that the settlement appropriately "reflect[ ed] 
an objective assessment of the patent's strength.,,215 Although Carrier 
suggests his approach as a middle way, he admits that the presumptive 
illegality may evolve, and "per se illegality might ultimately become a 
more appropriate treatment,,216 should '1udicial experience 
demonstrate[] that these arguments [from the economic literature] do 
. f: . 'f h ,,217 not m act JUstl y t e payments. 
206. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. EeoN. PERSP. 75 
(2005). 
207.1d. at 75. 
208. See id. at 93. 
209. See id. at 93-94. 
210. See Carrier, supra note 179, at 62. 
211. See id. at 67-68. 
212. See id. 
213.1d. 
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Yet another approach is offered by Marc G. Schildkraut, who 
criticizes the "probabilistic patent" approach of Lemley and Shapiro 
as well as the per se analysis of the FTC.218 In Schildkraut's view: 
[E]xplicit or implicit reverse payments are not 
necessarily anticompetitive. First, there are 
conditions under which an explicit or implicit 
"reverse" payment is necessary to settle patent 
litigation. There may be a gap between the parties 
that prevents settlement. This gap may be the result 
of a difference in perceptions about the outcome of 
the litigation or a difference in risk preferences. 
Sometimes a reverse payment can close the gap 
when it is impossible to close the gap by splitting 
time because the time has a different value to each 
party while the money has the same value. 
Second, the reverse payment that settled the 
litigation may result in entry before the probable date 
of entry under the litigation. Such a settlement can 
lead to early entry when the patent holder is risk 
averse and willing to accept less than it expects to 
obtain in litigation in order to settle. Or, the patent 
holder's perceptions about the outcome of litigation 
could simply be wrong. Under the circumstances, 
settling with reverse payments may be 
.. 219 procompetltlve. 
Schildkraut does argue that the settlements are extremely hard to 
evaluate because of the uncertainties in litigation and the subjective 
perceptions of the litigating parties.22o Nonetheless, instead of "simply 
giving up on settlements," he proposes that the parties to the 
settlement obtain prior court approval and thus avail themselves of the 
protections of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine?21 While on its face a 
sensible proposal, it is hard to see what tools the court would use to 
evaluate a settlement and its pro- or anti-competitive effects. The only 
plausible way to do this would be essentially to try the validity of the 
218. Marc G. Schi1dkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 
71 ANTiTRUSTLJ. 1033 (2004). 
219.id. at 1058 (footnote omitted). 
220. See id. at 1052-55. 
221.id. at 1068. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine arises from two Supreme Court cases, 
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and Eastern Railroad Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight. inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Under the doctrine, private 
parties are immune from antitrust liability for injuries that may arise out of petitioning the 
government and any state actions that result from such petitioning. See Schi1dkraut, supra 
note 218, at 1 057 (describing the doctrine). 
No.2] Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals 315 
patent - an approach that Schildkraut rejects.222 Thus, while his 
observations about the effects of reverse settlements may well be 
correct, it is not evident that courts can adjudicate the matter without 
holding the very trial that the settling parties seek to avoid. 
Professor Daniel Crane seeks to address the problem identified 
above.223 He also proposes an inquiry into the ex ante expectations of 
settling parties but suggests a tiered approach.224 Crane suggests that 
whenever there is a preliminary injunction in place, a reverse 
settlement should be presumptively lawful, as the presence of the 
injunction indicates that the court believes that the patentee is likely to 
succeed on the merits.225 In the absence of a preliminary injunction, 
Crane argues that a court should take a "quick look" into the strength 
of the patentee's case - akin to a preliminary injunction hearing-
and approve a settlement if the court concludes that the patentee was 
likely to succeed?26 Presumably, most settlements in the Hatch-
Waxman context would fall in the latter category despite the presence 
of a preliminary injunction. After all, in the Hatch-Waxman context, a 
30-month preliminary injunction on FDA approval is automatic227 and 
does not reflect any judicial determination of the patentee's likelihood 
of success. Crane's proposal is further refined by his suggestion that 
there be "a cap on the percentage of the patentee's monopoly rents 
that it may pay the defendant to exit the market.,,228 According to 
Crane: 
A settlement in which the patentee is willing to pay 
the alleged infringer a large percentage of its 
monopoly rents from the patent in exchange for the 
alleged infringer's promise to discontinue the 
infringing use reflects a low probability that the 
patent is valid or that the defendant's use is actually 
. ~. . 229 mlflngmg. 
Of particular relevance to the Hatch-Waxman settlements, Crane 
proposes that agreements that impose barriers to third parties' ability 
222. See Schildkraut, supra note 218, at 1054 (agreeing with the Valley Drug court that 
"after-the-fact analysis of a settlement ... would undermine patent incentives"). 
223. See Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent infringement Lawsuits: 
Antitrust Rules and Economic implications, 54 FLA. L. REv. 747(2002). 
224. See id. at 779-96. 
225.id. at 783-85. 
226.id. at 785-88. 
227. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (West 2011). 
228. Crane, supra note 223, at 788. 
229.id. This is indeed the same argument advanced by Lemley and Shapiro. See Lemley 
& Shapiro, supra note 206, at 94. But see Thomas, supra note 24, at 37-38 (arguing that the 
existence of reverse payments does not necessarily raise doubts about patent validity). 
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to enter the market should receive enhanced scrutiny.230 Because a 
number of the reverse settlements impose precisely these barriers (via 
agreements not to waive or transfer the l80-day exclusivity period), 
they would be subject to enhanced scrutiny. However, absent the 
ability to enter into an agreement to "bank" it, the exclusivity period 
may undermine the ability of the parties to settle. The patentee's 
incentive will be reduced because it may fear further challenges from 
more and more entities, while the generic's incentive could be 
reduced because it would no longer be able to count on increased 
profits during the l80-day period or from selling its exclusivity rights. 
While Crane's approach is quite solicitous of reverse settlements, 
it too presents significant problems. One of the main problems is 
identified in the Schildkraut article. Under Crane's proposal, a court 
would approve a settlement if it concludes that the patentee had 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on merits.231 Presumably, the 
converse is true as well: that is, the court would reject the settlement if 
such likelihood is not demonstrated. The problem is that a settlement 
may be pro-competitive even when the likelihood of success is below 
50%. As Schildkraut describes it: 
Consider a case where the patent holder believes it 
has only a 40 percent chance of prevailing. Being 
risk averse, it settles the case without net 
consideration by accepting 30 percent of the patent 
life. Clearly, we have not violated the uncertain 
competition standard. Yet, under the traditional 
standard of proof, there is an argument that the 
patent holder has violated the antitrust laws. Because 
the patent holder is likely to lose the patent litigation, 
a court might find that it has no legal basis for 
excluding the alleged infringer, even an exclusion 
that only lasts for 30 percent of the remaining patent 
life. If the patent holder is forced to litigate, 
however, there is a 40 percent chance it will prevail 
and exclude the alleged infringer until the end of the 
patent life. Although consumers would vote for the 
compromise, we cannot honor that consumer 
preference under the traditional standard ofproof.232 
As Schildkraut shows, reverse settlements may be pro-competitive 
even in the face of relatively low likelihood of success in litigation. 
230. See Crane, supra note 223, at 792-96. 
231. See id. at 783-88 (suggesting that the courts evaluate success on the merits either 
through the preliminary injunction proceedings or through the "quick look" proceedings). 
232. Schildkraut, supra note 218, at 1054-55. 
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Under Crane's approach, though, such settlements are likely to be 
disallowed by the courts. 
Some scholars, in particular Mark Lemley, Mark Janis, Herbert 
Hovenkamp, and Scott Hemphill, have recognized the difficulty with 
an antitrust approach that ultimately asks whether the patentee or the 
challenger would have prevailed at trial. In order to solve the problem, 
they suggest that the real question is not whether one side or another 
would prevail, but whether there is a loss to the public of a chance 
that the generic would prevail. 233 Although this approach is certainly 
theoretically interesting, I am skeptical that it offers much help. 
Almost no matter how strong a case one may have, there is always a 
chance that one will lose at trial. This is true not just of 
pharmaceutical litigation, but litigation in general. All settlements that 
end litigation, then, extinguish these chances of loss. Thus, this 
method is simply a new way of arguing that all reverse settlements 
should be per se illegal, even if the authors disclaim the per se 
approach. In response to this objection, Professor Hemphill makes a 
more narrow argument. According to Hemphill, any payment-
whether a side deal as in the Provigil litigation, or a pure money 
exchange, or even merely an agreement allowing the first filer to 
retain exclusivity - results in a delayed market entry as compared to 
what would be achieved without payment.234 The problem is that all 
settlements involve some exchange of benefits, as Hemphill himself 
recognizes?35 If that alone were enough to condemn settlements, then 
very few would survive an antitrust attack.236 Ultimately, Hemphill's 
argument, much like that of Lemley, Shapiro, Hovenkamp, and Janis, 
is predicated on the idea that patent validity is merely 
"probabilistic.,,237 I, on the other hand, tend to agree with Kevin 
McDonald that there is no reason to treat patents as any more 
"probabilistic" than any other form of property.238 For these reasons, 
Hemphill's supposedly more nuanced approach is also, in my view, 
not up to the task of solving the reverse settlement problems. 
Although the above discussion is not an exhaustive compendium 
of various academic views and approaches to the problem of reverse 
settlements, it is a fair representation of the divergent positions taken 
233. See c. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1553, 1557 (2006) [hereinafter Hemphill, 
Paying for Delay]; Hovenkamp et aI., supra note 205, at 1722 C[T]he outcome of a 
settlement agreement that would otherwise produce an antitrust violation might be no more 
anticompetitive than the outcome of litigation."). 
234. See Hemphill, Payingfor Delay, supra note 233. 
235. See id. at 1576-77. 
236. See id.; Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Antitrust: On 
"Probabilistic" Patent Rights and False Positives, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 68,68-69. 
237. See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 233, at 1589; Lemley & Shapiro, supra 
note 206; see also Hovenkamp et aI., supra note 205, at 1759. 
238. See McDonald, supra note 236, at 71. 
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by some eminent scholars. This lack of agreement in academia, 
Congress, the courts, and the Executive Branch leads me to conclude 
that a new approach is needed - one that would be based in patent 
law and serve the stated goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act. It is to this 
proposal that I now turn. 
V. SOLVING A PATENT PROBLEM THROUGH PATENT LAW 
As can be seen from the above disagreements, and as the courts 
and scholars have explicitly and repeatedly recognized, there is 
inherent and constant tension between antitrust law and patent law. 
While it is "well settled that the possession of a valid patent or patents 
does not give the patentee any exemption from the provisions of the 
Sherman Act,,,239 it is equally true that "the essence of a patent grant 
is the right to exclude others.,,24o Of course, to be legitimate, the 
exclusion must be only of a product that infringes a valid patent.241 
The question then ultimately turns on the validity of a patent, not on 
any payment from the patentee to the challenger. Even those who 
have advocated for a per se rule against reverse settlements have not 
suggested that such payments would be illegal if the patent were 
adjudged to be valid and infringed.242 The reason why some seek to 
ban reverse settlements is because they prevent adjudication of the 
patents and thus allow a patentee to exclude on the basis of what 
could be an invalid patent.243 If the worry is that brand-name 
manufacturers are enforcing invalid patents through reverse 
settlements, the best way to address the problem is through patent law 
itself. 
In enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress sought both to 
promote innovation by extending the terms of the patents on 
pharmaceuticals and to promote competition from lower cost generic 
alternatives?44 Additionally, as far back as 1892, the Supreme Court 
held that "[i]t is as important to the public that competition should not 
be repressed by worthless patents.,,245 Presuming, as canons of 
statutory construction require, that Congress legislated with full 
knowledge of the state of the law then extant,246 it follows that one of 
239. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948). 
240. Dawson Chern. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,215 (1980). 
241. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 206, at 93. 
242. Of course, if that were to occur, there would no longer be any need for such 
payments. Regardless, none of the reverse settlement critics have advanced the antitrust 
argument so far as to say that a hypothetical patentee with a judicially "confirmed" patent 
would be prohibited from paying a generic manufacturer whatever sums he wishes. 
243. See. e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 206, at 93. 
244. See supra Part 1l.A. 
245. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892). 
246. See. e.g., United States v. Wilson, 290 F.3d 347, 356-57 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
("Congress is presumed to preserve, not abrogate, the background understandings against 
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the purposes for which Congress enacted Paragraph IV was to 
encourage competition through the removal of "worthless patents" on 
pharmaceutical products. Congress thus constructed a system where 
competitors who would attempt to clear worthless patents would be 
rewarded. It is with reference to these goals that the solution to the 
problem of reverse settlements should be crafted. Restricting or even 
banning settlements simply does not remove worthless patents from 
the field. At most, banning the settlements would push more disputes 
into litigation where the outcome is far from certain. Some of the 
patents would likely be invalidated, thus serving the Hatch-Waxman 
Act's "clearing" goal. Others would be upheld, and the entry of the 
generic drug would be delayed beyond the time that could have been 
agreed upon between the parties, thus failing the Act's goals of 
increased competition and reduced prices. Simply put, the antitrust 
solution is a very imperfect tool to address the problem of reverse 
settlements and an even more imperfect tool to advance the goals 
Congress had in mind in enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act. Patent law, 
the very tool Congress used to create the Hatch-Waxman Act, is a far 
better instrument to address these issues. 
A. Patent Reexamination 
After a patent issues, it is presumed valid.247 The presumption, 
however, can be overcome during litigation by the accused 
infringer.248 Of course, in the context of reverse settlements, the 
litigation is avoided and that avenue is foreclosed. The other option is 
reexamination of the patent by the PTa. Reexamination is exactly 
what it sounds like - an examination of the patent anew.249 The 
major difference between a district court trial and a reexamination by 
the PTa is that the patent does not enjoy any presumption of validity 
during a reexamination process.250 Rather, the reexamination departs 
from the same starting point as the original examination: 
which it legislates. . Congress is presumed to be aware of established practices and 
authoritative interpretations ofthe coordinate branches."). 
247.35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
248. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
('"A patent is presumed to be valid, and this presumption only can be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary." (citation omitted)). 
249. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2006) (stating that "reexamination will be conducted 
according to the procedures established for initial examination"); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 
849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("In a reexamination proceeding ... the 'focus' of the 
reexamination 'returns essentially to that present in an initial examination.'" (quoting in re 
Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985»). 
250. Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1427 ("In a reexamination proceeding, on the other hand, there 
is no presumption of validity .... "). 
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[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of 
the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a 
prima facie case of unpatentability. If that burden is 
met, the burden of coming forward with evidence or 
argument shifts to the applicant. 
After evidence or argument is submitted by the 
applicant in response, patentability is determined on 
the totality of the record, by a preponderance of 
evidence ... ?51 
[Vol. 24 
There are two types of reexamination procedures: ex parte 
. . 252 d' . . 253 Th . reexamlllatlOn an lllter partes reexamlllatlOn.· e major 
difference between the two procedures is that during an inter partes 
reexamination, the third party that requested the patent be reexamined 
can participate in the process and appeal an unfavorable decision to 
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BP AI"), and then to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.254 In other words, 
the inter partes reexamination is in many ways similar to a proceeding 
in the district court and may be used in lieu thereof.255 The inter partes 
procedure presumes that there is a third party opposing the validity of 
the issued patent and willing to convince the PTa of the correctness 
of its views. Of course, if post-Paragraph IV certification parties enter 
into a settlement, it is unlikely that there will remain an entity 
interested in prosecuting the invalidity argument in the PTa. The 
following discussion thus focuses on the ex parte reexamination. 
However, the availability of an inter partes exam is important and will 
be discussed in Part VI.D, infra. 
Section 302 of the Patent Act authorizes "[a]ny person at any time 
[to] file a request for reexamination by the Office of any claim of a 
patent on the basis of any prior art.,,256 The person must identity the 
prior art that he believes is relevant to the question of patentability 
and explain why the cited art raises a "substantial new question of 
patentability. ,,257 If the Director 0 f the Patent Office determines that a 
"substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of a 
patent is raised, the determination will include an order for 
251. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
252. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (2006). 
253. See id. §§ 311-18. 
254.Id. § 315(b). In an ex parte reexamination, only the applicant is entitled to appeal an 
adverse decision. See id. § 306. 
255. See id. § 314 (describing the requirement of serving each document on the opposing 
party and allowing both the patent owner and the third party requester to file written 
responses and arguments with the Patent Office); id. § 315 (allowing both the patent owner 
and the third party requester to appeal unfavorable decisions). 
256.Id. § 302. 
257.Id. § 303; see also id. § 302. 
No.2] Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals 321 
reexamination of the patent for resolution of the question.',258 The 
examination proceeds much like the initial examination, except it is 
generally conducted by senior examiners who were uninvolved with 
the original examination.259 Once the examiner makes a final decision, 
a patent owner may appeal any unfavorable ruling to the BPAI or the 
Federal Circuit (as he would have been able to do during the original 
examination)?60 Ultimately, once the reexamination is concluded, a 
reexamination certificate is issued either confirming the claims, 
canceling them, amending them to narrow their scope, or a 
combination thereof.261 
In addition to permitting any third party to file requests, the 
regulations promulgated under the statute permit the Director to order 
reexamination on his own initiative.262 "Such reexamination may be 
ordered at any time during the period of enforceability of the 
patent.,,263 Although the PTO has the authority to order a 
reexamination at any time, its own rules specify that "[a] decision to 
order reexamination at the Director's initiative is, however, rare. Only 
in compelling circumstances, after a review of all the facts concerning 
the patent, would such a decision be made.,,264 If the decision is made, 
the reexamination proceeds as any other reexamination would. 
It is important to understand that reexamination is ordered only 
when there is a "substantial new question of patentability." That is a 
threshold inquiry.265 The inquiry, however, is not limited to focusing 
on prior art that was unavailable to the PTO during the initial 
examination. The statute permits for reexamination "on the basis of 
any prior art.,,266 This means that even if a given piece of prior art was 
considered during the initial application, it could still raise a 
"substantial new question of patentability," if for instance the Director 
258.1d. § 304. 
259. See MPEP § 2236 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010). 
260.35 U.S.C. § 306. 
261. See id. § 305 ('"No proposed amended or new claim enlarging the scope of a claim 
of the patent will be permitted in a reexamination proceeding under this chapter."); id. § 307 
('"[T]he Director will issue and publish a certificate canceling any claim of the patent finally 
determined to be unpatentable, confirming any claim of the patent determined to be 
patentable, and incorporating in the patent any proposed amended or new claim determined 
to be patentable. "). 
262. See id. § 303(a) ('"On his own initiative, and any time, the Director may determine 
whether a substantial new question of patentability is raised by patents and publications 
discovered by him .... "); 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2010). 
263. MPEP § 2239 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010). 
264.1d. While the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures does not delineate what 
constitutes "compelling circumstances," the Director has previously ordered reexamination 
in high profile cases. See Troy L. Gwartney, Note, Harmonizing the ExciusionaJY Rights of 
Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1395, 1407-08 (2009) 
(describing the Patent Office's sua sponte reexamination and ultimate rejection of patents 
that were involved in the controversial Blackberry litigation). 
265. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 303-04. 
266.1d. § 302. 
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determines that the initial examination did not fully or properly 
consider that piece of evidence. In other words, no new evidence 
needs to be cited to the PTO in order for the reexamination to be 
ordered. 
B. Utilizing the Reexamination Process 
The reason patentees choose to enter into reverse settlements with 
the accused infringers is because of a chance that at trial the patent 
may be found invalid?67 If a patentee had a 100% chance of winning 
in court, there would be no reason at all to settle,268 except in those 
cases where the cost of litigation itself exceeds the value of injunctive 
relief. Given the money at stake in pharmaceutical litigation, the cases 
where favorable judgment is of little worth to the patentee can be 
expected to be exceedingly rare. It has been conceded, even by those 
who find no antitrust fault with reverse settlements, that "the size of 
the payment to refrain from competing, sometimes called a 'reverse 
payment' or an 'exit payment,' raises the suspicion that the parties 
lacked faith in the validity of the patent.,,269 Although courts have 
rejected an approach through which the size of the settlement would 
be considered an admission of the patent's invalidity, they agree that 
the relative strength of the patent is one of the important 
considerations in deciding whether and on what terms to settle the 
1·· . 270 ItlgatlOn. 
Using the above insight, I propose a different approach to the 
problem of reverse settlements - one that takes into account the size 
of the settlement, but one that does not sound in antitrust law, nor 
require either the courts or administrative agencies to engage in post 
hoc evaluations of patents' strengths or parties' ex ante expectations. 
Instead, reverse settlements that involve payments of more than 
reasonable litigation expenses should be treated as a signal to the 
Patent Office that private parties (the patentee and the generic 
challenger) have some doubts about the strength of the patent at issue. 
If the size of the settlement exceeds reasonable litigation costs and 
cross-license fees, it would indicate that the doubts are 
"substantial" - in other words, that there exists in the minds of the 
parties a "substantial new question of patentability" of the patent in 
267. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
268. See Graham, supra note 20, at 445 n.143; Hovenkamp et aI., supra note 205, at 
1758-59. 
269. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2003). 
270. See. e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1073-74 ("It is 
uncontested that parties settle cases based on their perceived risk of prevailing in and losing 
the litigation .... Assuming the patent is reasonably strong, and the parties then settled 
under this scenario, the money most probably would flow from the infringers to 
Schering .... "). 
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suit. The Patent Office can then decide whether such question indeed 
exists, and if so, order the patent into reexamination proceedings. 
If a reexamination is triggered, the Patent Office can then use its 
expertise to determine whether the claims are valid. If it determines 
that they are, it would necessarily follow that the settlement was 
proper, for the exclusion of the generic would not be the result of an 
illegal payment, but the result of the scope of a now-confirmed valid 
patent. Alternatively, should the PTO reject the claims, thus removing 
the patentee's ability to enforce a now-nonexistent patent, the market 
would become open to any other generic manufacturer that wished to 
enter it. All a generic manufacturer would need to do is file an ANDA 
with Paragraph I certification, certifYing that no patent covers the drug 
in question.271 Assuming that the generic would be able to satisfY the 
bioequivalence requirements,272 nothing would stand in the way of the 
FDA approving the generic version and that version entering the 
market to the benefit of consumers.273 In this way, the consumer-
protection purposes of antitrust law would be served. So too would be 
the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act, as the procedure would both 
allow the quicker entry of the generic drugs and the removal of 
worthless patents from the public sphere. 
One of the fundamental advantages of the proposed approach is 
that it does not depend on adversarial litigation or any particular party 
challenging a patent. Because the PTO conducts its reexamination ex 
parte274 upon either its own motion or following a submission from 
"any person," the patentee cannot possibly contract away this 
procedure, unlike the judicial inquiry, which can only proceed when 
there is a "case or controversy.,,275 Consequently, it would be 
impossible for the patentee and the generic challenger to collude in 
order to keep an invalid patent on the market while splitting the supra-
competitive profits. 
271. See 21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (West 2011). 
272. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). 
273. The first filer may still be able to enjoy a l80-day marketing exclusivity period, but 
even so, the market would be open at worst 180 days later rather than a number of years 
later. Alternatively, the l80-day period may be forfeited under the MMA.Ifthe underlying 
patent was invalid, it would follow that the settlement was anti-competitive, and therefore 
likely to have violated antitrust laws. Under the MMA's amendments, a generic that enters 
into a settlement that is found to violate antitrust laws forfeits its l80-day exclusivity period. 
21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(D). 
274. As discussed earlier, there is a provision of inter partes reexamination, but it need 
not be utilized in order to engage in the reexamination. See supra notes 253-55 and 
accompanying text. 
275. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2. 
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C. The Proposed Procedure 
If reverse settlements are to lead to patent reexamination, there 
must be a set of rules that would dictate when the settlements would 
trigger the reexamination, who would serve as the reviewing authority 
for the trigger, and what information should be available to that 
authority. Adopting a per se rule that would require a reexamination 
of all patents subject to reverse settlements would be inconsistent with 
the understanding that some settlements are not only economically 
beneficial to the settling parties and to consumers, but do not betray 
any doubt on the part of the patentee about the patent's strength.276 
The premise of the system that I am proposing, on the other hand, is 
that certain settlements do raise a "substantial new question of 
patentability" regarding the patents in suit. Additionally, the presence 
of a "substantial new question" is a statutory requirement for 
reexamination.277 Even the FTC, with its uncompromising position, 
realizes that some reverse settlements do not point to any doubts about 
patent validity.278 
At the same time, judging the appropriateness of a settlement's 
size can only be accomplished by reference to the value of the 
underlying patent: the stronger the patent, the more valuable it is, and 
therefore, the larger the settlement will be. If these considerations had 
to be examined prior to reexamination proceedings, there would 
essentially be two separate inquiries into the strength of the patent, 
making the system too unwieldy and unpredictable. 
In my view, any reverse settlement where the amount of money 
paid to the generic challenger exceeds reasonable litigation costs plus 
reasonable payments for any cross-licenses that are part of the 
agreement should be referred to the PTO. That, however, leaves open 
the question of valuating the cost of litigation and side deals. 
Avoiding protracted adjudication over this issue is important if the 
reexamination solution to the reverse settlement problem is to work. 
Consequently, I would impose an approach similar to that advocated 
by the FTC and Professor Hemphill,279 albeit in a different context-
presuming that every settlement above a certain amount is a signal 
that there exists a substantial new question of patentability. I would 
adjust the FTC's presumption to state that any settlement in excess of 
$2 million will be presumed to raise enough substantial new questions 
276. See Thomas, supra note 24, at 37-38. 
277. 35 U.S.C. §§ 303-04 (2006). 
278. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(describing the FTC's position that settlements which do not exceed the cost of litigation are 
not anti-competitive, as long as such litigation costs are below $2 million). 
279. See id. (stating that FTC would presume all settlements over $2 million to be in 
violation of antitrust laws); Hemphill, supra note I, at 636. 
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of patentability to trigger the reexamination request.280 Additionally, I 
agree with Professor Hemphill that some (though not all) cross-
licensing deals may also be little more than a convenient cover for an 
otherwise anti-competitive settlement.281 To police against that, I 
would suggest that a second-level presumption be created: that any 
reverse settlement involving a cross-licensing side deal also be 
presumed to raise a substantial new question of patentability if the 
payments under the side agreement exceed some specified amount.282 
Faced with settlements that exceed the limits set in regulations, 
the FTC will be able to request that the PTO reexamine the patent 
subject to the settlement. The PTO will then be able to consider, under 
its regular procedure, whether there are indeed "substantial new 
questions of patentability" and, if so, order the patent into a full 
reexamination. In determining whether such questions exist, the PTO 
will be able to rely on the documentation compiled and arguments 
made by the generic manufacturer in support of its ANDA Paragraph 
IV filing. I would therefore propose that whenever reverse settlements 
are concluded, such information be turned over to the PTO. This 
should not place a significant burden on the generic manufacturer. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act (as amended by the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003) already requires 
any applicant that files an ANDA under Paragraph IV to provide "a 
detailed statement of the factual and legal basis of the opinion of the 
applicant that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed.,,283 Thus, 
the generic manufacturer must have an opinion of counsel on the 
validity of the patent that is being challenged under Paragraph IV. The 
opinion, which must be prepared in good faith,284 would identifY a 
relevant basis for invalidating the patent. 
280. The actual dollar amount can be adjusted as needed if and when the average cost of 
litigation changes. 
281. See Hemphill, supra note I, at 632. 
282. I leave the actual dollar value to those more skilled in economic valuation of patents 
and licenses; however, a $20 million cap does not seem unreasonable. Relatedly, I would 
reject Hemphill's suggestion that all settlements that allow the challenger to keep the 180-
day exclusivity period be treated in the same way as other reverse settlements, even if no 
money exchanges hands. See Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 233, at 1588-94. In 
Hemphill's view, because the retained exclusivity confers a potentially multi-million dollar 
benefit on the generic, it functions in exactly the same way as a payment.ld. at 1560. The 
problem is that in such a situation, the patentee is not giving up anything of value. 
Consequently, a settlement where the generic is simply allowed to retain the exclusivity 
period does not signal that the patentee has substantial questions about the patentability of 
its invention. 
283.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(1l) (West 2011). 
284. See Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 375 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), ajj'd, 231 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ('"In filing its paragraph IV 
certification along with its ANDA, Schein represented that 'in the opinion of the applicant 
and to the best of its knowledge' the ... patent was invalid. However, the patent law 
imposes an affirmative duty of due care on one making such an assertion, and this standard 
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The only change that my proposal would require is that the 
opinion be shared not just with the patentee and the FDA, but also 
with the PTa. The law already requires the settling parties to notity 
the FTC whenever they enter into reverse settlements and to file the 
full text of the agreement with the FTC.285 Requiring the parties to 
also file an already-prepared opinion of counsel identitying the basis 
for the claims of invalidity would not impose any additional burden 
on either party. The opinion would identity for the Director the "new 
questions of patentability" and be buttressed by the finding that the 
size of the settlement exceeds the reasonable cost of litigation plus the 
reasonable value of any cross-licenses. Armed with this evidence, the 
PTa would determine, applying current statutory rules, whether it 
should proceed to reexamination. The PTa would make that decision 
aided by, but independent of, the opinion of counsel that was 
submitted with the initial Paragraph IV certification and any other 
documents that became available to the challenger during discovery. 
The reexamination itself would not automatically follow a reverse 
settlement. Rather, the settlement would only require the PTa to 
consider whether a full reexamination should be ordered. 
In short, the system that I propose would utilize the PTa's 
existing authority to reexamine patents, and would simply focus the 
PTa's attention on those patents that the patentee and a competitor, 
through their behavior, have identified as raising substantial new 
questions of patentability. As I describe in the following Part, my 
proposal would broaden the scope of reexamination, so that all 
questions of validity - not just those based on prior art - could be 
addressed. 
VI. RESPONSES TO COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
The patent solution to the problem of reverse settlements is, in my 
view, a better approach than the blunt tool of antitrust law. However, 
this approach is not free of its own potential shortcomings. I will 
address a few of these shortcomings and suggest how the law should 
be fine-tuned in order to mitigate these problems. 
A. Limited Reexamination Trigger 
Currently, reexaminations may be conducted only when certain 
prior art can be shown to invalidate the patent.286 In other words, 
is applied in determining if one such as Schein had an objective good faith basis for such 
action." (citation omitted). 
285. MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111-18, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
286. See Scope of Reexamination in Ex Parte Reexamination Proceedings, 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.552 (2010); MPEP § 2258 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010). 
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reexamination covers only § 102 (anticipation)287 and § 103 
(obviousness)288 rejections. At trial, on the other hand, an issued 
patent can be attacked on other grounds, such as § 112 (lack of written 
description or enablement),289 double patenting,290 or inequitable 
conduct291 in front of the PTO during the original prosecution. None 
of these grounds are cause for reexamination in the PTO,292 yet all of 
these grounds would be part of the settlement calculus. A patent 
holder may legitimately fear losing a case on the grounds of 
inequitable conduct or lack of enablement and enter into a reverse 
settlement in order to avoid that prospect. The settlement is meant to 
avoid a likely invalidation of the patent, and yet, under the present 
law, the PTO would be powerless to reexamine the patent as it is not 
invalidated by any prior art. This calls for a change in the 
reexamination procedures. In order for reexamination to be an 
effective policing tool against improper settlements, the PTO must be 
given authority to order a patent into reexamination for any 
potentially invalidating reason. In determining whether the patent 
ought to be reexamined, it should make no difference whether the 
patent fails to comply with Section 102 or Section 112 of the Patent 
Act. Any failure to comply with the Act's requirements should be 
sufficient to remove the patent from the public sphere. The authority 
to order patents into reexamination for reasons other than prior art 
invalidation would not change the reexamination process itself. Once 
the patent enters the process, it should no longer matter why it did so. 
During the process it would be treated like every other patent 
application and subjected to the same full set of requirements. 
The burden on the PTO should not noticeably increase if the 
scope of its authority to order a patent for reexamination is broadened. 
First, the PTO already has a process to "reexamine" patents that fail 
the written description or specification requirements. Section 251 of 
the Patent Act permits correction of a patent through a reissue 
"[ w ]henever any patent is, through error without any deceptive 
intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of 
a defective specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee 
287.35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
288.1d. § 103. 
289.1d. § 112; see, e.g., ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 943 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (affirming lower court finding that a patent was invalid due to lack of 
enablement). 
290. See. e.g., Sun Pharm. Indus. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (discussing the prohibition on double patenting). 
29l. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
('"[W]e are compelled to conclude that 'inequitable conduct' occurred. Accordingly, all 
claims of the patent must be held unenforceable."). 
292. MPEP § 2258 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) ('"Issues other than those indicated in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section [both dealing only with printed prior art] will not be 
resolved in a reexamination proceeding."). 
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claiming more or less than he had a right to claim in the patent. ,,293 
The patentee can correct a written description or enablement problem 
through a reissue.294 Moreover, until 1988, the PTO examined reissue 
applications for conformance with the duty of disclosure?95 This 
shows that the PTO is fully capable of addressing inequitable conduct 
issues in post-grant review. 
The current statutory scheme governing reissue applications only 
permits the patent owner himself to request such proceedings?96 In 
contrast to the reexamination process, neither the Director of the PTO 
nor a third party may request reissue proceedings. That limitation 
presents a serious obstacle to accomplishing full review of a 
pharmaceutical patent within the PTO. In order for my proposed 
scheme to work, the PTO must be given the authority to review the 
patent for all potential problems and not just those that can currently 
be reviewed in the reexamination proceedings. Congress is presently 
considering such an authority, albeit in a different context. The 
pending Patent Reform bill would permit any third party to request, 
and the PTO to conduct, post-grant review "on any ground that could 
be raised under section 282 (relating to invalidity of the patent or any 
claim).,,297 If this same mechanism, together with resumption of 
review for compliance with the duty of disclosure, is adopted for the 
settlement review process that I am advocating, it would permit the 
PTO to fully examine the patent. This will preclude the possibility of 
reverse settlements serving as a shield against a finding of invalidity 
on grounds other than anticipation or obviousness. 
B. Non-infringement Paragraph IV Certification 
The Paragraph IV certification comes in two varieties: the non-
infringement claim and the invalidity claim?98 Submitting an ANDA 
with either claim puts the first entrant in the position of claiming the 
293.35 U.S.C. § 251. 
294. See in re Amos, 953 F.2d 613, 618 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the reissue 
application was examined for compliance with the enablement and written description 
requirements, and that those requirements were satisfied). 
295. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF 37 CFR 1.56, 1095 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 16 (Oct. 11, 
1988); see also Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of 
u.s. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition - and Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 77 n.51 (1998). As of 1988, the Patent Office has abandoned the 
practice and now treats as dispositive the applicant's affidavit that the mistake sought to be 
corrected in the reissue process was not a result ofa deceptive intent. MPEP § 1448 (8th ed. 
Rev. 8, July 2010) (explaining that ·'[t]he Office no longer investigates or rejects reissue 
applications under 37 CFR 1.56," which imposes a duty of disclosure). 
296.35 U.S.C. § 251. 
297. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, l1lth Congo § 5(f)(1) (as reported by S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Apr. 2,2009) (emphasis added). 
298.21 U.S.CA § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(lV) (West 2011). 
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ISO-day exclusivity period?99 Yet, if the basis for the approval of the 
generic drug is only a finding of non-infringement, then the patent 
remains valid as against future entrants. If a Paragraph IV certification 
on the basis of invalidity is followed by a reverse settlement, there 
would be no advantage for subsequent entrants to challenge the 
patent, for they will not be entitled to the ISO-day exclusivity period. 
N either would there be a basis for the PTO to reexamine the patent, 
for there will be no opinion of counsel that the patent is in any way 
invalid. Such an outcome arguably presents a problem because it 
allows the parties to collude in order to avoid judicial determination of 
non-infringement. Avoidance of such a determination may improperly 
preserve a broader scope of exclusivity than the patent itself warrants. 
In other words, even though the patent claims by themselves only 
permit the patentee to exclude certain products, a reverse settlement 
that avoids the finding of non-infringement effectively permits the 
exclusion of additional products. 
The proposal I layout does not help solve the problem of reverse 
settlements following the certification of non-infringement, whereas 
the antitrust-based approach would. Although that is certainly a 
drawback to my solution, I am not convinced that it is a major one. 
Even though the same consequences flow from certification of non-
infringement and certification of invalidity, I suggest that the 
fundamental problem with reverse settlements is not a delay in the 
market entry of certain generic drugs, but that settlements may stifle 
innovation by permitting continued occupation of the public sphere by 
worthless patents. 300 No such problem presents itself when the generic 
manufacturer does not challenge the validity of the patent, but rather 
certifies non-infringement only. Furthermore, it is likely that the 
majority of challenges contest validity rather than non-
infringement.301 Because any ANDA filer has to show that the generic 
drug it seeks to market is bioequivalent - in other words, essentially 
the same as the patented drug - it is very likely that the generic 
version would read on the patent. As a result, I am not overly 
concerned about non-infringement Paragraph IV certifications being 
used as a prelude to anti-competitive reverse settlements. At the same 
299.1d. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(l). 
300. To be sure, the delay in market entry for lower cost generics does hurt consumers as 
it increases the price of medical care. Nonetheless, the delay in and of itself does not have 
an impact on the patent and innovation system as a whole. Furthermore, the cost to 
consumers is not that high. See Tracy L. Regan, Generic Entry. Price Competition, and 
Market Segmentation in the Prescription Drug Market, 26 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 930, 946 
('"While it is reasonable to expect that a branded drug's price would be higher than those of 
its generic competitors, branded firms are often able to maintain, or in some instances even 
to raise, their prices when confronted with generic entry into their market."). 
301. Although the collection and analysis of data on the types of Paragraph IV challenges 
being pursued is not within the scope of this Article, I intend to collect and analyze such 
data in a follow-up piece to the present Article. 
330 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 24 
time, the question of such certifications' frequency certainly bears 
more investigation. 
C. Undermining Settlements 
Another possible objection to my approach is that it would 
dissuade parties from entering into settlements, thus undermining the 
judicial policy of favoring out-of-court settlements?02 The argument 
is that if every settlement is subject to review and potential patent 
invalidation through the reexamination process, patentees will be 
dissuaded from entering settlements because they will lose the 
certainty that their property rights will remain intact. Even though the 
argument is appealing on the surface, it does not withstand close 
scrutiny. 
As an initial matter, it should be observed that some companies 
voluntarily request reexamination of their patents even after entering 
into reverse settlements?03 This practice suggests that the prospect of 
reexamination does not necessarily inhibit or undermine the 
conclusion of settlements between patentees and generic 
manufacturers. There is little reason to believe then that the 
mechanism I am proposing would change this dynamic. 
Fundamentally, the threat of patent reexamination following 
reverse settlements will not affect patentees' desire to enter into 
settlements because my proposal does not create any new significant 
threat for the patentees. Recall that at present, the Director can, sua 
sponte, order any patent into reexamination at any time upon 
concluding that there exists a substantial new question of patentability 
in light of prior art?04 All patents, including pharmaceutical patents, 
are subject to this threat of reexamination.305 The presence or absence 
of a settlement agreement does not affect the Director's ability to 
exercise reexamination authority. My proposal would bring only 
moderate changes to the Director's ability to exercise this already-
existent power. First, the Director would have access to the research 
compiled by the generic applicant as part of the ANDA application 
process. Access to this research, in and of itself, should not give the 
patentee any qualms, for it merely eases the work that the PTO can do 
of its own volition. Such access does not in any way prejudice the 
302. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005) ('"The 
general policy of the law is to favor the settlement of litigation, and the policy extends to the 
settlement of patent infringement suits."). 
303. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXPARlb" REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 
I (2010) [hereinafter REEXAMINATION FILING DATA], available at http://reexamcenter.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2009/08/2010-06-30-Ex-Parte.pdf (noting that 34% of all requests are 
filed by the applicants themselves). 
304.35 U.S.C. § 304 (2006). 
305.1d. 
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patentee, as all of the information that the ANDA filer gathers is 
presumably public. In essence, granting the PTO access to such 
research is no different than the PTO hiring in-house reviewers to 
continuously review issued patents and advise the Director if a 
reexamination ought to be ordered. The PTO has such authority 
presently, although it almost never chooses to exercise it.306 
The second change in the Director's authority to order 
reexamination would be slightly more significant. Under my proposal, 
the authority would be moderately expanded to permit reexamination 
not just on the basis of prior art, but on any basis that would raise new 
and substantial questions of patentability.307 While this would extend 
the overall vulnerability of patents to reexamination, it would not 
fundamentally change the nature or strength of the patentee's rights. 
Furthermore, my proposal for extending the scope of reexamination 
proceedings is not limited to those instances where proceedings are a 
result of the Hatch-Waxman process. Rather, it is my view that the 
Director ought to be able to order a reexamination - and, if 
necessary, to reject claims - whenever there is a substantial new 
question of patentability of whatever variety.308 If that were the case, 
again, the presence of a reverse settlement would not in any way 
change the Director's authority or ability to reexamine a patent. The 
reverse settlement would simply serve as a triggering event for the 
Director to determine whether a substantial new question of 
patentability exists. Whether such a question exists, though, will be 
determined not based on the fact that two parties reached a settlement, 
but on the patent's compliance with the legal requirements of the 
Patent Act. 
D. Amendments in Reexamination 
Most of the patents that enter reexamination do not emerge from 
the process unchanged. Of the patents that enter reexamination, less 
than a quarter exit with all their claims confirmed, and twelve percent 
of reexaminations result in all claims being cancelled.309 The vast 
majority of reexaminations (65%) result in changes to the claims?lO 
This tendency potentially presents a problem. If a patent subjected to 
a reexamination is neither fully confirmed nor fully cancelled, but 
306. See supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text. 
307. See supra Part VI.A. 
308. Indeed, the currently pending Patent Reform Act would confer such power on the 
Patent Office, albeit limited to the first nine months post-issuance. Patent Reform Act of 
2009, S. 515, lllth Congo § 5(f)(1) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 
2009). 
309. REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 303, at 2. 
31O.1d. These numbers do not depend significantly on who requested the 
reexamination - whether the patentee, the Director, or a third party. 
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rather reissued with different claims, the reexamination may not have 
served the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act, but merely replaced 
one questionable patent with another. Since the amended claims 
would not have been reviewed for weakness and invalidity by any 
opposing counsel, there is a danger that these claims would be only 
marginally stronger than the original claims. Such a situation would 
result in no improvement over the current condition where a patentee 
is able to pay the challenger in order to forego the challenge and 
preserve a questionable patent. 
While there is no perfect response to the above objection, several 
factors mitigate the seriousness of the problem. First, a reexamined 
patent, even if amended, would have gone through the examination 
process not once, but twice. An additional examination inherently 
increases the odds that the final amended claims are valid. This is 
particularly true given that reexaminations are conducted by senior 
examiners who are more experienced,3ll and therefore presumably 
better at evaluating and assessing patent applications. An application 
that has gone through the rigorous reexamination process is much less 
likely to be vulnerable to an invalidity challenge, especially if the 
reexamination evaluates not just novelty, but full compliance with the 
requirements of the Patent Act, as I propose. Second, the 
reexamination proceedings do not permit broadening of claims; rather, 
the patentee is only permitted to narrow the claims further. I do not 
propose to change this limitation. Since the claims can only be 
narrower in scope, and because narrower claims necessarily sweep 
less prior art into their ambit, they will more likely survive a validity 
challenge. 
Furthermore, should additional protection against issuing dubious 
amended claims be desired, the reexamination procedure itself can be 
adjusted. The Patent Office could be required to permit third parties to 
comment on the reexamination proceedings. There already exists an 
opportunity for inter partes reexamination that in some ways 
resembles adversarial trial proceedings. However, in the inter partes 
proceedings as currently constituted, only the patentee and the third 
party that requested the reexamination can submit information and 
arguments to the PTO. Any interested member of the public could be 
allowed to comment on the reexamination process following a reverse 
settlement. Much of the information is already publicly available 
through the PTO' s Patent Application Information Retrieval ("PAIR") 
system.312 All that would be required is to permit the public to submit 
arguments to the PTO as to why the claims, even as amended, should 
not issue. If the examiner considers the arguments and then issues the 
claims anyway, it would provide considerable evidence that the 
311. See MPEP § 2236 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010). 
312. See id. § 2232. 
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amended claims are indeed valid and that the goals of Hatch-Waxman 
are satisfied. Similar approaches have been proposed for all patent 
examination proceedings?l3 The resolution of a debate over whether 
all examination should be opened for public input is beyond the scope 
of this Article. However, opening the reexamination proceedings for 
public participation would lessen any concern, to the extent that such 
concern exists, that the patent reexamination procedure following a 
reverse settlement might be gamed in such a way as to maintain 
invalid patents in the public sphere. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Reverse settlements between pharmaceutical companies present a 
challenge to the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Settlements that 
seek to insulate an invalid patent from challenge prevent consumers 
from benefiting from reduced generic prices and retard innovation by 
others. At the same time, legitimate settlements are economically 
efficient and have the added benefit of easing the strain on a severely 
overburdened judicial system. Because some of the settlements may 
be beneficial, it makes little sense to adopt a blanket ban on the 
practice as has been proposed by some members of Congress. This is 
especially true given that many of these settlements involve various 
cross-licenses, making it extraordinarily difficult to determine which 
settlements would be legal and which would not. Antitrust law is also 
an imperfect solution to the problem, as it either imposes a blanket 
ban on such settlements or requires collateral litigation over patent 
validity. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act has worked well for many years because 
it used amendments to patent law to fix a problem in patent law. Since 
its original enactment, the new problem of reverse settlement has 
arisen. Up until now, the courts, the Executive Branch, Congress, and 
academia have all tried to resolve the issue through the application of 
ill-fitting antitrust law. This approach is poorly suited for what 
ultimately is a patent law problem. By expanding the scope of the 
Patent Office's reexamination authority, and by assigning the task of 
evaluating the ultimate validity of questionable patents to the agency 
with expertise in patent law, the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
the ability of parties to enter into beneficial and legitimate settlements 
will both be preserved. It is through this system that consumers of 
drugs and medical devices would derive the most benefit. 
313. See S. 23, 112th Congo § 5 (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8,2011) (providing for post-
grant review that can be initiated by any member ofthe public on any invalidity grounds). 
